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Ever since Justice Holmes opined that “[t]he most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic,”1 debate has raged over what should be required for a challenged regulation 
of speech to survive First Amendment attack. The Supreme Court’s approach has 
been anything but tidy. In one famous article, Geoffrey Stone identified seven 
different standards of review that the Court has used to evaluate laws that regulate 
speech or expression without reference to the content of the regulated speech, and 
three more for laws that are content-based.2 
Scholars have struggled to explain our sprawling First Amendment doctrine—
once described by Justice Stevens as “an elaborate mosaic of specific judicial 
decisions, characteristic of the common law process of case-by-case adjudication.”3 
The position that has gained the most traction in recent scholarship has stressed the 
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 1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 2. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47–54 
(1987). For more recent summaries of the rather elaborate structure of First Amendment 
doctrine, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.1 (8th ed. 
2010); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2:61–:72 
(2009). 
 3. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300 (1993). 
2 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1 
 
primacy of governmental motive—this school of thought argues that the 
constitutionality of a challenged regulation is effectively based on an assessment of 
the likelihood that the regulation reflects a governmental motive to burden 
disfavored speech or speakers.4 Then-Professor Elena Kagan, one of the leading 
advocates of this purposivist view of First Amendment jurisprudence, put it this 
way: “First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past 
several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of 
improper governmental motives.”5  
To be sure, the Supreme Court has expressed doubt about making the 
constitutionality of legislation turn on the legislature’s purpose in light of the 
hazards of determining the collective motivation of a legislature.6 Purposivists 
argue, however, that the difficulties in ascertaining motive have led the Court to 
develop doctrines that utilize proxies for impermissible motive.7 For example, the 
Court’s use of strict scrutiny for laws directed at the content of speech is said to be 
based on the risk that content regulation reflects official hostility to disfavored 
content, coupled with the difficulties that inhere in requiring those seeking to 
vindicate First Amendment rights to prove illicit motivation.8 Similarly, the 
insistence of First Amendment jurisprudence on adequate standards to cabin the 
discretion of officials who regulate speech is said to be based on a concern that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of 
Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 931–54 (1993); Lillian R. BeVier, 
The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 1280, 1289–93 (2005); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443–505 
(1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 775–98 
(2001); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions on Speech and the First Amendment: A 
Motive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 
401, 415–20 (1995); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 190, 195–204 (1988); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First 
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 624–35 (1991). Professor Stone, for his part, has 
emphasized the importance of governmental motive but considers it one of several central 
themes in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and 
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227–33 (1983); Stone, supra note 2, at 
54–57. The move toward purposivism in First Amendment scholarship seemingly has its 
origins in John Ely’s seminal article on the role of governmental motive in constitutional 
law. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 
YALE L.J. 1205, 1327–41 (1970). 
 5. Kagan, supra note 4, at 414.  
 6. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–86 (1968). Purposivists, though 
taking pains to note that they are not concerned with the intentions of individual legislators, 
generally refer to governmental “motive” and “purpose” interchangeably. See, e.g., Kagan, 
supra note 4, at 414–16, 427–42; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 793–94, 826; Williams, supra 
note 4, at 697–702. It seems they have been convinced by Professor Ely that there is no 
meaningful distinction between legislative purpose and motive. See Ely, supra note 4, at 
1217–21. 
 7. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 414; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 775–76. 
 8. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 4, at 1293–96; Kagan, supra note 4, at 438–72; 
Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 785–87, 793; Stone, supra note 4, at 230–33; Strauss, supra note 
4, at 192–95. 
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absent such standards, regulation will be infected by difficult-to-detect illicit 
motives.9 Conversely, generally applicable laws that nevertheless impose burdens 
on expression are reviewed more deferentially because of the reduced likelihood 
that such broad-based laws are intended to harm only disfavored speech or 
speakers.10 A jurisprudence based on these kinds of categorical judgments about the 
likelihood of an illicit governmental motive is thought to be preferable to one that 
endeavors to balance the costs and benefits of a challenged regulation of speech 
because the latter inquiry, it is said, cannot be performed in any principled way and 
would instead amount to an invitation for unbridled judicial activism.11  
The only frontal attack to date on the purposivist account has come from 
perhaps the leading pragmatist of our day, Judge Richard Posner, who has argued 
that speech regulations should be assessed by consideration of their costs and 
benefits.12 Judge Posner contends that many aspects of First Amendment doctrine, 
such as the Cold War–era Supreme Court’s decisions upholding prohibitions on 
Communist advocacy, and more recent decisions upholding regulations on 
pornography, reflect a willingness to uphold regulations likely to be infected by 
official hostility to the speech at issue based on a pragmatic assessment of the 
harmful tendencies of such speech and its limited benefits.13 Yet, the force of Judge 
Posner’s argument, at least as a descriptive matter, is undercut by the Court’s 
general unwillingness in recent decades to accept this type of “dangerous tendency” 
claim. For example, unlike the Cold War–era cases,14 contemporary doctrine 
generally protects “dangerous tendency” speech—such as speech advocating 
violence or unlawful conduct—unless it is directed at producing imminent 
violence.15 Obscenity doctrine as well seems to have evolved in a manner 
consistent with the purposivist account; the Court, for example, has held that 
determinations about whether sexually oriented expression lacks serious literary, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 456–60; Strauss, supra note 4, at 196–97; 
Williams, supra note 4, at 703–04. 
 10. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 491–505; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 797; 
Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 415–18; Williams, supra note 4, at 722–28. 
 11. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 4, at 932–45; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 787–92. 
 12. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment 
Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 738–41 (2002). 
 13. See id. at 741–42. Barry McDonald has similarly called for pragmatic balancing in 
First Amendment analysis, but unlike Judge Posner, he is willing to concede that this 
approach is inconsistent with much of contemporary First Amendment doctrine, which 
seems to him to reflect an inquiry into governmental motive. See Barry P. McDonald, 
Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of 
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1393–426 (2006). 
 14. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228–30 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494, 508–11 (1951) (plurality opinion); id. at 546–56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
id. at 567–70 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 15. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409–10 (1989); NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–29 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 
108–09 (1973) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per 
curiam). 
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artistic, political, or scientific value may not be based on community standards 
because of the risk that such evaluations will reflect hostility to unpopular views.16 
Other scholars have offered what amount to quibbles.17 Frederick Schauer, for 
example, has questioned the purposivist account by claiming that much 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). To be sure, the Court has 
tolerated regulation of sexually oriented expression when based on its secondary effects on 
the surrounding community, see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
46–50 (1986), but purposivists claim that this doctrine reflects a reduced likelihood of 
improper motivation when the regulation is justified on the basis of secondary effects rather 
than the communicative effects of the regulated expression. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 483–
91; Williams, supra note 4, at 630–35. 
 17. In the category of quibbles, John Fee has identified what he claims are a number of 
examples in which regulations reflecting a high likelihood of impermissible governmental 
motivation are nevertheless subjected to less exacting judicial scrutiny—the regulation of 
government-subsidized speech, the speech of public employees, and speech within specially 
created governmental fora; the regulation of mass media and political campaign finance; 
regulation protecting captive audiences from unwanted expression; and the regulation of 
what is thought to be low-value speech, such as defamation, pornography, and fighting 
words. See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1136–47 (2005). But 
these examples are not body blows to the purposivists. As for the first three categories, 
purposivists acknowledge that speech by the government itself or within public institutions 
represents a special case. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 432–33. The Court has explained 
that it permits regulation that disadvantages particular speakers or viewpoints in this line of 
cases “based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). Indeed, there is a growing recognition 
that public institutions must sometimes undertake to manage the content of speech within 
those institutions in order to achieve otherwise constitutionally permissible objectives. See, 
e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 
234–65 (1995); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 85–93 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Principles, 
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106–18 (1998). As for mass 
media, purposivists note that the Court has tolerated regulation in this area only when it 
addresses bottlenecks that may reduce the overall quantity and diversity of speech, an 
approach that suggests no illicit motive. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 464–65; Rubenfeld, 
supra note 4, at 804 & n.80. As for campaign finance regulation, purposivists explain the 
Court’s hostility toward regulations justified by limiting the influence of particular speakers 
in the political process as based on the threat of improper motive. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 
464–72; Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 802–07. Moreover, the Court has become increasingly 
hostile to such regulation, stressing that Congress cannot be trusted to devise regulation that 
may disadvantage particular speakers or viewpoints, such as those who may oppose 
incumbent officeholders. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99, 904–05; Davis v. 
FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773–74 (2008). As for judicial tolerance of regulation protecting 
captive audiences, purposivists argue that this doctrine merely reflects proper solicitude for 
the rights of listeners rather than an illicit motive. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 830–31. In 
any event, this is a narrow doctrine, which generally has no application outside of the 
regulation of unwanted speech in an unwilling listener’s home. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209–11 (1975); 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (per curiam); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 21 (1971). As for so-called low-value speech, purposivists argue that with the 
possible exception of obscenity, these regulations, by fully protecting political speech and 
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uncontroversial regulation of speech as an aspect of unlawful conduct—as in laws 
against fraud or discrimination—reflects a governmental effort to punish disfavored 
messages.18 Purposivists, however, have a powerful answer to this objection; as we 
have seen, they argue that laws of general applicability—such as generally 
applicable laws forbidding fraud or discrimination—present little danger of 
suppressing speech on any identifiable subjects and therefore create little risk that 
only those who address unpopular subjects will face regulation.19  
Conversely, Eugene Volokh has quarreled with the purposivists’ claim that 
generally applicable laws require no special First Amendment scrutiny, correctly 
observing that even generally applicable enactments, such as breach-of-the-peace 
or disorderly conduct laws, are subject to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny when 
their application turns on the content of speech.20 The purposivists again have a 
powerful response; their view is that even generally applicable laws, such as 
breach-of-the-peace statutes, merit special scrutiny when they are not tied to 
reasonably clear noncommunicative harms because in such cases they facilitate 
enforcement against unpopular groups or views.21 Beyond that, another flaw in 
Professor Volokh’s position, at least as a descriptive matter, is reflected in his 
related argument that the First Amendment is offended by any regulation aimed at 
the communicative impact of speech, regardless of motive: “Speech restrictions 
that accomplish their ends by trying to stop people from persuading others are per 
se unconstitutional, regardless of whether they are narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest (so long as the intent-imminence-likelihood threshold isn’t 
                                                                                                                 
permitting no prohibition on the expression of any identifiable viewpoint, pose little danger 
of suppressing disfavored speech. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 472–81; Stone, supra 
note 4, at 242–44. They add that First Amendment doctrine rarely permits regulation of 
speech merely because it is thought to be of low value. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 
822–26. Even as to sexually oriented expression, First Amendment jurisprudence can be 
understood to concern itself with the threat of illicit motive; as we have seen, the Court’s 
obscenity jurisprudence does not permit assessments of the social value of speech to be 
based on community standards because of a concern that this will disadvantage unpopular 
speech or speakers. See supra text accompanying note 16. And the Court has utilized strict 
scrutiny to evaluate prohibitions on such “low-value” but nonobscene speech by insisting 
that it be tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest unrelated to the suppression 
of ideas. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–15 (2000); 
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126–27 (1989). 
 18. See Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 
NW. U. L. REV. 562, 564–68 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 278–79 (1981). 
 19. See supra text accompanying note 10. Conversely, laws of this type that apply only 
to particular speakers or messages are thought to offend the First Amendment because of the 
risk that they reflect government hostility toward disfavored messages. See R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–94 (1992). 
 20. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1287–93, 1301–03 (2005). The Supreme Court has recently 
confirmed the soundness of this observation. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S. Ct. 2705, 2723–24 (2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 461–64; Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 415–17; 
Williams, supra note 4, at 701–02. 
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crossed).”22 Nevertheless, the view that any law aimed at the communicative 
effects of speech should be treated as suspect cannot explain large areas of doctrine, 
such as pornography, “fighting words,” defamation, and commercial speech, where 
such regulation is permitted.23 Indeed, Professor Volokh’s view seems to have been 
decisively rejected only last Term, when the Court upheld a statutory prohibition on 
providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization as applied to 
support for a terrorist organization coming in the form of speech because of the 
critical national security interests advanced by the prohibition, despite the fact that 
the prohibition was necessarily based on the communicative effects of the speech at 
issue.24 
The Supreme Court, for its part, has been less than consistent on the role of 
motive in First Amendment adjudication. Sometimes, the Court has acted 
consistently with the purposivist account. In striking down a statute that prohibited 
burning the American flag, for example, the Court wrote: “If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”25 Similarly, in striking down a hate crime ordinance 
even though it had been construed as proscribing only unprotected “fighting 
words,” the Court wrote: “The First Amendment generally prevents government 
from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the 
ideas expressed.”26  
On other occasions, however, the Court has struck a different note. In the Term 
preceding the hate-crime case, for example, as the Court invalidated a state law 
requiring that funds paid to the author of a book or other work of art that describes 
a crime for which the author had been convicted be escrowed to ensure their 
availability to satisfy a judgment against the author, the Court denied that 
legislative motivation was at the core of First Amendment analysis:  
The Board next argues that discriminatory financial treatment is suspect 
under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2454 (1996). 
 23. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Kagan, supra note 4, at 435–37, 
472–83. When discussing speech intended to persuade others to engage in illegal activities, 
the Court has more recently reiterated that some speech is treated as unprotected precisely 
because of its communicative effects:  
[O]ffers to give or receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value 
and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection. Many long 
established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy, 
incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is 
intended to induce or commence illegal activities. Offers to provide or requests 
to obtain unlawful material, whether as part of a commercial exchange or not, 
are similarly undeserving of First Amendment protection.  
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (citations omitted).  
 24. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724–31. 
 25. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 26. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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suppress certain ideas. This assertion is incorrect; our cases have 
consistently held that “[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non 
of a violation of the First Amendment.” . . . “We have long recognized 
that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can 
restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First 
Amendment.”27  
The Court later upheld a Colorado statute limiting the ability of protesters to 
approach patients outside of health care facilities on the basis of the state’s interest 
in protecting patient privacy,28 even though it was undisputed that the statute’s 
enactment was primarily motivated by the activities of antiabortion protesters.29 
Apparently indifferent to the risk that the law reflected legislative hostility to the 
right-to-life message, the Court denied that “a statute is ‘viewpoint based’ simply 
because its enactment was motivated by the conduct of the partisans on one side of 
a debate.”30 Instead, the Court concluded that the statute was “content-neutral” 
for three independent reasons. First, it is not a “regulation of speech.” 
Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur. 
Second, it was not adopted “because of disagreement with the message 
it conveys.” This conclusion is supported not just by the Colorado 
courts’ interpretation of legislative history, but more importantly by the 
State Supreme Court’s unequivocal holding that the statute’s 
“restrictions apply equally to all demonstrators, regardless of 
viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no reference to the content 
of the speech.” Third, the State’s interests in protecting access and 
privacy, and providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to 
the content of the demonstrators’ speech.31 
Thus, the Court seems to have focused on the operation of the challenged statute 
and not the threat of impermissible motivation. Still, purposivists might take 
comfort in the Court’s emphasis on the statute’s general applicability as minimizing 
the risk of discrimination against disfavored speech or speakers. 
This article offers a challenge to the purposivist account. It begins, in Part I, by 
considering the claims of the purposivists in light of the original meaning of the 
First Amendment. Part I offers the first exploration in the scholarly literature of the 
original meaning of the First Amendment in light of the recent turn in scholarly and 
judicial thinking about originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
Although there is something of a scholarly consensus that the intentions of those 
who framed the First Amendment are impossible to determine, in recent years 
originalist thinking about constitutional interpretation has made a dramatic move 
away from a jurisprudence based on the intentions of the framers or ratifiers and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
117 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)). 
 28. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000). 
 29. Id. at 715. 
 30. Id. at 724. 
 31. Id. at 719–20 (footnote omitted). 
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toward the original public meaning of constitutional text as the touchstone for 
constitutional interpretation. An inquiry into original public meaning offers a bit 
more clarity about the original meaning of the First Amendment than original-
intention originalism was able to generate and provides reason to question the 
purposivist account. 
Part II examines the purposivist account of First Amendment jurisprudence as it 
has evolved since the framing. Much as John Ely used a then-unresolved issue of 
First Amendment law to illustrate the structure of First Amendment doctrine,32 Part 
II illustrates the role of governmental purpose in First Amendment doctrine by 
considering a yet-unresolved issue that has divided the lower courts and 
commentators—the extent to which the First Amendment constrains the ability of 
the government to undertake investigations on the basis of the protected speech of 
the investigation’s target. Terrorism investigations, for example, can be triggered 
when the government becomes aware of political extremists as a consequence of 
their statements expressing approval of jihadist violence, or their attendance at 
events that condone such conduct, even though these activities are constitutionally 
protected under contemporary doctrine.33 The purposivist account suggests these 
“First Amendment investigations” must clear the hurdle of strict scrutiny because, 
in the absence of sufficient standards to limit the discretion of investigators, they 
are unacceptably likely to be infected by governmental hostility toward the target’s 
ideology. Indeed, history suggests that the risk that an impermissible motivation 
may accompany such investigations is quite real.  
Yet, subjecting the government’s decision to undertake an investigation to strict 
scrutiny is inconsistent with fundamental principles of First Amendment doctrine 
that suggest that the government’s effort to learn more about those who may be 
plotting to break the law should not be equated to a legal prohibition on 
constitutionally protected speech. The use of strict scrutiny to assess the propriety 
of an investigation encounters potent pragmatic objections as well—it is often 
necessary to undertake an investigation without having any clear idea of what it 
will uncover; and because investigations do not pose the same threat to free speech 
as prohibitions, they should not require an equivalent justification. At least on any 
attractive and coherent account, the interaction between the First Amendment and 
criminal investigations involves an assessment of the justification for the 
investigation and the extent to which it inhibits constitutionally protected activity—
precisely the kind of pragmatic balancing that the purposivists denounce.34  
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization 
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). 
 33. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 34. Questions about what kind of justification is sufficient for regulating (or 
investigating) speech should be distinguished from questions about the justifications for 
constitutional protection for speech. Frederick Schauer has provided a helpful three-part 
typology of the arguments supporting constitutional protection for speech: first, arguments 
that claim protection for speech as an activity that is essential to the process of public 
deliberation necessary for a politically accountable democracy; second, arguments that claim 
protection for speech as an activity that is essential to the search for truth; and third, 
arguments that claim protection for speech as an activity that enables individuals to pursue 
an essential component of a widely shared conception of the good life. See FREDERICK 
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Finally, Part III considers the structure of First Amendment doctrine. Part III 
contends that current doctrine reflects the centrality of pragmatic balancing, with 
the concept of a free marketplace of ideas providing the essential metric to govern 
the balancing inquiry. Regulations likely to distort the marketplace of ideas impose 
particularly heavy costs to First Amendment values, thereby requiring particularly 
powerful justifications. To be sure, the purposivists are right that balancing can be 
dangerously indeterminate, but First Amendment doctrine handles this objection 
with a highly structured approach to balancing based on a series of categorical 
judgments about the likelihood that a challenged regulation will distort the 
marketplace of ideas. 
Structured balancing, however, breaks down when it becomes difficult to assess 
the likelihood that challenged government conduct will distort the marketplace of 
ideas. A prime example of this problem is presented by First Amendment 
investigations, which can be performed in a responsible and discrete fashion 
unlikely to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, or in an abusive and 
oppressive fashion. When it comes to First Amendment investigations, ad hoc 
balancing is the only tenable approach. Thus, in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
pragmatic balancing is inescapable.  
I. THE ELUSIVE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
One plausible reaction to the purposivists’ account of First Amendment doctrine 
is to change the subject. Some might say that by focusing on the structure of judge-
made doctrine, purposivists ask the wrong question. The Constitution is, after all, 
written. One can argue that in light of the written character of the Constitution, the 
proper starting point for any problem of constitutional law is by reference to the 
meaning of the governing text, and the best way to understand a legal text is 
                                                                                                                 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 15–59 (1982). First Amendment doctrine 
largely accepts all three justifications; while the Court has long regarded speech about 
politics and government as at the core of the First Amendment, see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–71 (1963), nonpolitical speech capable of advancing truth or a 
conception of the good life has been protected as well:  
It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment “was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” But our cases have never 
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, 
literary, or ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive list of labels—is not 
entitled to full First Amendment protection. 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). Indeed, as we have seen, the Court has treated 
sexually oriented speech as protected as long as it has any type of serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value, and has added that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is 
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation 
omitted). Still, as we will see, the fact that given expressive activity falls within an accepted 
justification for First Amendment protection does not mean it will receive such protection if 
there are sufficient countervailing interests in regulating or proscribing the activity.  
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originalist in character—by reference to its meaning at the time it was originally 
adopted.35 
In the 1970s and 1980s, originalists usually took the position that the text of the 
Constitution should be interpreted with reference to the intentions of its framers.36 
This approach confronted enormous difficulties. First, because the process of 
adopting constitutional text is a collective one, the problems that inhere in an effort 
to determine collective intention of those involved in framing and ratification are 
great.37 Second, the rules for interpreting texts that the framers and ratifiers would 
have understood as controlling in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries suggested 
that they were to be interpreted according to the ordinarily understood meaning of 
their terms, without regard to anyone’s subjective intentions.38  
In the 1990s, however, originalists increasingly embraced the view that the 
Constitution should be construed according to its meaning as understood by the 
public in the framing era; this approach was said to avoid the difficulties in 
ascertaining subjective yet collective intentions while vindicating the Constitution’s 
character as a legal text.39  
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 100–09 (2004); GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 92–94 (1992); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS 31–38 (1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 50–61 (1999); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 289–
92 (1988). 
 36. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977); Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the 
Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988). 
 37. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING 
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 14–25 (2002); 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 284–398 (1988); 
Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456–74 
(1984); Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers 
Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 30–36 (1995); Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209–22 (1980); 
Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical 
Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to 
It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 (1997); Marc V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793–804 (1983). 
 38. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340–65 (1996); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in 
Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1006–62 (1991); 
Finkelman, supra note 37, at 351–58; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985). 
 39. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 35, at 92–117; PERRY, supra note 35, at 28–53; 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 35, at 160–212; Baade, supra note 38, at 1103–07; Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–307 (2007); Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
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In the wake of this turn to original public meaning, originalism enjoyed quite a 
comeback. Thomas Colby has written that “[t]he new originalism, reconstructed in 
terms of original public meaning, is a theory on the rise.”40 Randy Barnett has 
claimed that among academics, originalism has become “the prevailing approach to 
constitutional interpretation.”41 James Ryan believes that “a compelling and 
popular alternative theory has yet to emerge from the academy or from sitting 
judges as a serious competitor to originalism.”42 In short, as Jamal Greene recently 
observed, “originalism continues to sell.”43  
Even the Supreme Court seems to have embraced public-meaning originalism. 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,44 as it confronted the Second Amendment’s right 
“to keep and bear Arms,”45 the Court wrote:  
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he 
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its word and 
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
their technical meaning.” Normal meaning may of course include an 
idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that 
                                                                                                                 
YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, 
and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–259 (1987); 
Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 751, 756–60 (1987); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force 
of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–48 (2003); Gary 
Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on 
Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–
87 (1997); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the 
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia 
v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940–55 (2009); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541–45 (1998) 
(reviewing RAKOVE, supra note 38). 
 40. Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of 
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 532 (2008). 
 41. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 
(1999). For accounts of the turn toward originalism among legal scholars, see, for example, 
DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 
20–54 (2005); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101–216 (2005). This is not to say that admiration for originalism 
is universal in the academy. For some of the more powerful attacks on the move toward 
original public meaning, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2009); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185; Larry 
Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907 (2008). 
 42. James E. Ryan, Does It Take A Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and 
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 
(2005)). 
 43. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009).  
 44. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 45. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding 
generation.46 
Thus, constitutional adjudication should be based on an “examination of a variety 
of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text.”47  
Accordingly, an originalist might dismiss efforts to determine the structure of 
the free speech doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court as beside the point; 
doctrine is properly dictated by the original meaning of the text itself: “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”48 
Indeed, originalism seems to be gaining greater prominence in the Court’s 
approach to free speech doctrine. In its recent decision in United States v. Stevens,49 
for example, the Court characterized the doctrinal limitations on the scope of First 
Amendment protection that it had recognized as consisting only of those categories 
of speech that have been historically considered to be without legal protection.50 
Thus, it may be that the key to First Amendment doctrine is to be found in history. 
There has not yet been an assessment of the First Amendment’s Speech and 
Press Clauses’ original public meaning in the scholarly literature. Indeed, it turns 
out that the originalist approach to interpretation of the First Amendment is easier 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
 47. Id. at 2805 (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia, the author of the opinion in Heller, 
is an avowed advocate of utilizing the original public meaning of the text in constitutional 
adjudication. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This might be overstating the irrelevance of doctrine, 
however, even for originalists. It is true that some originalists largely reject nonoriginalist 
precedent. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as 
Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 262–69 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, Text 
vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947 (2008); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
289 (2005). But others are more sympathetic to nonoriginalist precedent, at least in some 
circumstances. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare 
Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444–61 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 823–50 (2009); Henry 
Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 
739–72 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 47, 
at 129, 138–40; Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare 
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
155, 195–96 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, 
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 436–79 (2006). 
 49. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 1584–86. The matter is complicated, however, by the Court’s 
acknowledgement that new categories of unprotected speech, such as child pornography, can 
be recognized when they are “intrinsically related” to unlawful conduct, id. at 1586, and the 
Court’s willingness to leave open the possibility that some extreme depictions of animal 
cruelty might be unprotected despite the lack of historical support for such regulation, id. at 
1592. 
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said than done. The historical evidence concerning the original meaning of the 
Speech and Press Clauses is frustratingly inconclusive, but an inquiry into original 
public meaning sheds at least some light on the character of the First Amendment. 
A. The Framing-Era Meaning of the First Amendment 
The framing-era conception of freedom of speech and the press was anything 
but capacious, at least by contemporary standards. As Blackstone’s Commentaries 
summarized the law: 
[W]here blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or 
scandalous libels are punished by the English law . . . the liberty of the 
press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated. The 
liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but 
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not 
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every 
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases 
before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: 
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must 
take the consequences of his own temerity. . . . [T]o punish (as the law 
does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when 
published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious 
tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of 
government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. 
Thus the will of the individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that 
free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint 
hereby laid upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private 
sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad 
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which 
society corrects.51  
On this view, the concept of free expression was quite limited; the freedom of the 
press consisted only of a prohibition against prior restraint without limitation on the 
ability of the law to impose after-the-fact punishment on any expression thought to 
be “of a pernicious tendency.” Blackstone’s account was enormously influential in 
colonial-era American law, which largely accepted this view of the power to punish 
expression thought to be harmful.52  
Still the Blackstonian view was not uncontested. The problem with the 
Blackstonian conception, after all, is that it offers little meaningful protection since 
anything thought to be “of a pernicious tendency” may later lead to punishment. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151–52 
(emphasis in original). For a helpful summary of English law prior to the framing of the First 
Amendment, see 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.3 (4th ed. 2009).  
 52. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 767–68 (1953); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE 
PRESS 119–219 (1985); Thomas F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the 
Federalist Period; The Sedition Act, 18 MICH. L. REV. 615, 627–37 (1919–20). 
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The rule against prior restraints precluded outright censorship, but a speaker 
wishing to avoid jail might engage in self-censorship that could be no less effective 
as a means of suppressing speech. This line of argument was not unknown in early 
America; a number of Blackstonian critics advanced it in the founding era.53 This 
view seems to have had some resonance among the public at large; the 1735 
seditious libel prosecution of John Peter Zenger for publishing attacks on a colonial 
governor resulted in an acquittal despite the judge’s refusal to instruct the jury that 
truth was a defense to the charge.54 The Zenger prosecution, moreover, provoked 
enormous criticism of the Blackstonian rule that truth was not a defense to libel 
and, indeed, of the concept of seditious libel itself.55  
As a practical matter, the Zenger trial seems to have led to the demise of 
seditious libel in colonial America; the Zenger prosecution appears to have been the 
last of its kind in the colonies.56 Moreover, as Lucas Powe has observed, although 
there was no indication that the law of seditious libel was formally repudiated in 
the years leading to the American Revolution, the prevalence of activity that 
amounted to seditious libel under Blackstonian standards among the increasingly 
rebellious colonists suggests that the concept of seditious libel may have been 
something of a dead letter by the framing of the First Amendment.57 Still, the fact 
that the colonists had little objection to seditious libel when directed at a colonial 
government that they found increasingly oppressive did not mean that they would 
reject the concept when it came to a constitutional government that they themselves 
chose by free election. For such a government, established by a Constitution to 
which the people themselves had agreed, perhaps the Blackstonian conception 
would be thought appropriate. 
The first ten amendments to the Constitution had their origins in the anti-
Federalist attacks on the original Constitution’s lack of a Bill of Rights, which 
appears to have persuaded leading federalists that the addition of such protections 
was a political necessity.58 Constitutional recognition of freedom of the press, and, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16–22 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1954) (1941); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S 
DARLING PRIVILEGE” 30–51 (2000); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN 
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 428–31 (1956); David A. Anderson, 
The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 463–64, 486–94 (1983); William T. 
Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 91, 109–14 (1984); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on 
Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 802–11 (1985) 
(reviewing LEVY, supra note 52). 
 54. For a detailed account of the prosecution, see THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (Vincent 
Buranelli ed., 1957). 
 55. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in 
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 21, 36–42 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981). 
 56. See Harold L. Nelson, Seditious Libel in Colonial America, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
160, 167–71 (1959). Indeed, during the debates over what became the Sedition Act of 1798, 
Rep. Claiborne observed: “Prosecutions of this kind have very rarely happened; in some of 
the States, a cause of this kind had never been tried.” 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2135 (1798). 
 57. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 28–50 (1991). 
 58. For helpful accounts, see ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW 
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to a lesser extent, freedom of speech, figured prominently in the debate over the 
original Constitution; seven state ratifying conventions had proposed constitutional 
amendments protecting freedom of the press, and four also proposed protection for 
freedom of speech.59 Even so, the anti-Federalist arguments consisted of 
generalized demands for protection of the freedom of the press, with virtually no 
criticism of Blackstone’s view on the scope of that protection.60 As for freedom of 
speech, anti-Federalists said virtually nothing about it.61 Indeed, at the time of the 
original Constitution’s ratification, while the constitutions or laws of all thirteen 
states protected freedom of the press, only Pennsylvania and Vermont offered 
protection for freedom of speech as well.62 Perhaps more important, no state had 
departed from Blackstone either by judicial decision or statute with respect to either 
freedom of speech or the press.63 
The original proposal for the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses was 
presented by James Madison to the First Congress in broad terms: “The people 
shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their 
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, 
shall be inviolable.”64 Even if the proposal’s reference to “the freedom of the press” 
were thought to be a reference to Blackstone’s description of that same concept, the 
prior clause suggested broader protection, if only to avoid redundancy. Madison’s 
language, however, did not survive. The House appointed a Committee of Eleven 
to consider this and Madison’s other proposed constitutional amendments, and 
although no records of its deliberations survive, what emerged from the committee 
was something close to the final form of the Speech and Press Clauses: “The 
freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to 
                                                                                                                 
JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 57–95 (1997); 
RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 120–77 
(2006); and Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 322–44. 
 59. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 
92–93 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 60. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 52, at 220–56. For the original materials, see THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 97–115. The closest to any criticism of the 
Blackstonian view is a complaint by Cincinnatus that the proposed constitution would permit 
Congress to subject the press to criminal liability. See Reply to Wilson’s Speech: 
“Cincinnatus” [Arthur Lee] I, reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 92, 93–95 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).  
 61. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY 61–63 (2008). One comprehensive collection of anti-Federalist material, for 
example, contains only two passing references to freedom of speech, both from the Federal 
Farmer. See Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government 
Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It. 
In a Number of Letters from a Federal Farmer to the Republican, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 214, 245 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (letter IV); id. at 323, 329–30 (letter 
XVI). 
62. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 93–96.  
 63. See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious 
Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 171–78 (2001). 
 64. Proposal by Madison in House, June 8, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 59, at 83. 
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assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for 
redress of grievances, shall not be infringed.”65 The use of the definite article at the 
beginning of this sentence hints at a reference to a preexisting legal concept, and 
given the state of framing-era law, the most likely suspect is Blackstone. This 
proposal passed the House with no discussion of the meaning of the Speech and 
Press Clauses.66 
At the time, the Senate met in secret and kept a journal reflecting its actions in 
skeletal form.67 The only action pertinent to the Speech and Press Clauses that was 
taken was to reject an amendment to qualify those clauses with the language, “[i]n 
as ample a manner as hath at any time been secured by the common law.”68 The 
Senate later added the “Congress shall make no law” formulation at the beginning 
of the amendment and conjoined the proposal with clauses protecting the free 
exercise of religion while prohibiting an establishment of religion.69 After a 
conference committee agreed on the Senate version of the Speech and Press 
Clauses,70 the proposed amendment passed both Houses and was sent to the states 
for ratification without further substantive discussion of the Speech or Press 
Clauses.71 No record survives of the debates in the ratifying states, or of the public 
discussion of the proposed amendment.72  
It is difficult to know what to make of these events. As we have seen, Madison’s 
original draft seemed to lean away from Blackstone, but the Committee of Eleven’s 
redraft seems to return closer to the traditional view. Still, the Senate seems to have 
rejected a proposal to track the common law which, as we have seen, had never 
repudiated Blackstone. That suggests that at least some in the Senate understood 
the House’s formulation as potentially deviating from Blackstone—whether the 
proposal was understood as more or less speech-protective, however, is unclear. 
Yet, perhaps the Senate proposal was merely offered for clarification, and rejected 
as unnecessary. Drawing inferences from the failure to adopt an amendment, after 
all, is a perilous business.  
Perhaps more important, because the public knew little of the Senate’s closed 
deliberations, from the standpoint of original public meaning, what may have been 
the Senate’s willingness to depart from the common law seems to have little 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. House Committee of Eleven Report, July 28, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 84. 
 66. See id. at 96–97. 
 67. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 
1789–1801, at 10 & nn.27 & 29 (1997). 
 68. Further Senate Consideration, Sept. 3, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 59, at 85. 
 69. Further Senate Consideration, Sept. 9, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 59, at 86. 
 70. Conference Committee Report, Sept. 24, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 59, at 89. 
 71. House Consideration of Conference Committee Report, Sept. 24 [25], 1789, in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 89; Senate Consideration of Conference 
Committee Report, Sept. 24, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 90–
91; Further Senate Consideration of Conference Committee Report, Sept. 25, 1789, in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 91–92. 
 72. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 52, at 267; Anderson, supra note 53, at 486. 
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interpretive significance. What may be more important from the standpoint of 
original public meaning is that Blackstone’s conception of the freedom of press 
seemed to have been something of a dead letter since the Zenger case. For that 
reason, it is far from clear that the public would have understood the First 
Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses to have been Blackstonian in character. 
Moreover, whatever the Senate’s reasons for rejecting the proposal that would have 
had the First Amendment track the common law—presumably a matter of concern 
to intentionalists but not for advocates of original public meaning—any textualist 
should find it hard to disregard the difference between the Seventh Amendment, 
which expressly references and preserves the common law right to a jury in civil 
cases,73 and the First Amendment’s far more uncertain reference to prevailing 
common law standards.74 
Even more perplexing, especially from the standpoint of original public 
meaning, is the First Amendment’s parallel protections for freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press. Blackstone’s account, as we have seen, described “the liberty 
of the press.”75 The First Amendment’s Press Clause might therefore be thought to 
codify Blackstone’s account, but Blackstone did not describe “the freedom of 
speech,” and it seems unlikely that this phrase had any generally accepted public 
meaning in the framing era. As David Anderson observed, “freedom of speech, 
unlike freedom of the press, had little history as an independent concept when the 
first amendment was framed.”76 Perhaps the two clauses were meant to do no more 
than apply the same legal regime to written and spoken words much as the law of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 74. David Anderson has drawn attention to the fact that the First Amendment’s text 
contains no express qualification on the rights of free speech and a free press, unlike later 
state constitutional provisions that added the Blackstonian qualification that the press is 
responsible for the abuse of its freedom. See Anderson, supra note 53, at 488. It is hard to 
put too much weight on this observation, however, since framing-era state constitutions 
usually did not contain a similar qualification, and yet framing-era law followed Blackstone, 
as we have seen. Still, one such qualifier appeared in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. 
See id. at 488 n.200. 
 75. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *151–52; see supra text accompanying note 51.  
 76. Anderson, supra note 53, at 487. The closest Blackstone came to describing “the 
freedom of speech” is in the discussion of the rights of members of Parliament: 
[I]t is declared by [statute] as one of the liberties of the people, “that the 
freedom of speech, and debates, and proceedings in parliament, ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.” And this 
freedom of speech is particularly demanded of the king in person, by the 
speaker of the house of commons, at the opening of every new parliament.  
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *160. This suggests an absolute protection, far different 
than that ordinarily afforded to speech outside of Parliament. This concept is an unlikely 
explanation for the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, since it already appeared as a 
protection for Members of Congress in the original Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. As 
we will see, in the framing era and in the nineteenth century, no one seemed to understand 
the Speech Clause as providing the kind of absolute protection afforded legislators. 
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defamation was divided into libel and slander, permitting civil or criminal liability 
for either oral or written defamatory statements without allowing a defense of 
truth.77 This explanation for the separate Speech and Press Clauses, however, is far 
from clear. The concept of prior restraint had been used with respect to schemes for 
licensing or enjoining the publication of written material, not mere “speech.”78 
Thus, it is uncertain whether it would have made sense to anyone to protect speech 
against prior restraint. If the Blackstonian rule against prior restraint had little 
apparent application to “speech,” then the two-clause approach may have signaled a 
departure from Blackstone.  
What does come clear, however, is the nearly complete lack of discussion of any 
alternative to the Blackstonian conception during the framing era. Even if the 
Blackstonian view had been rejected, it is quite unclear what the public could have 
understood had taken its place. Perhaps nothing except the sensibilities of 
American juries had replaced Blackstone; Akhil Amar, for example, has argued 
that the upshot of the Zenger acquittal was largely limited to a recognition that the 
consequence of a rule forbidding prior restraints was that speech could not be 
punished unless a jury could be persuaded to convict.79 But, on this view, the First 
Amendment does little if any work not performed by the right to trial by jury. Some 
might find an account of the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses that 
pretty much drains them of independent meaning less than persuasive. In any event, 
given the paucity of surviving evidence about how the First Amendment was 
understood by the public during ratification, any inquiry into the original public 
meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses seems awfully difficult to undertake.80 
There is, however, one more source to consult. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *123–25 (slander); 4 id. at *150–51 (libel). 
Indeed, framing-era courts and commentators, although treating defamation actions as 
subject to review under the First Amendment, nevertheless held defamation to be 
unprotected. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of 
Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 253–57 (2010). 
 78. Although the rule against prior restraints was understood in the framing era to forbid 
both licensing requirements and injunctions against publication, this rule seems to have 
arisen exclusively in cases involving the publication of written material. See Stephen A. 
Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. 
REV. 655, 674–99 (2008).  
 79. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 23–
24 (1998). 
 80. David Lange and Jefferson Powell, while not claiming to have undertaken a 
comprehensive analysis of the original public meaning of the First Amendment, have 
pointed to a handful of framing-era statements that seem to reject Blackstone’s conception: 
Alexander Hamilton’s comment in The Federalist opposing constitutional protection for 
freedom of the press on the ground that its meaning was uncertain; an exchange of 
correspondence between Chief Justice William Cushing of the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
and John Adams suggesting that Massachusetts’s constitutional protection for “liberty of the 
press” required recognition of a defense of truth in defamation actions; and a letter of John 
Marshall, then in France in diplomatic negotiations, relying on the concept of freedom of the 
press to reject French suggestions that his government should repress anti-French 
publications as harmful to the public on the ground that such a suggestion was inconsistent 
with American conceptions of a free press. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, 
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B. Original Meaning and the Debate over the Sedition Act 
There is an additional basis for insight into the framing-era meaning of the First 
Amendment—the events surrounding the Sedition Act of 1798. 
The Sedition Act provided: 
[I]f any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or 
procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly 
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the 
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the 
United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to 
defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or 
the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or 
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred 
of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the 
United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for 
opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the 
President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of 
the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to 
resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or 
abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, 
their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted 
before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall 
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by 
imprisonment not exceeding two years.81 
On the one hand, the Act is notable for treating falsity as an aspect of seditious 
libel. As we have seen, Blackstone did not recognize truth as a defense to 
defamation;82 but, it seems that by 1798, undiluted Blackstonism was too much for 
                                                                                                                 
NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 203–
08 (2009). While this is useful evidence, only Hamilton’s statement was made in a public 
forum, and one might conclude that Hamilton’s view was ultimately repudiated by the 
ratification of the First Amendment. As for the others, it is unclear how to weigh the 
importance of privately expressed sentiments as a matter of original public meaning when 
they are uncorroborated by evidence that reflects the general public’s understanding. Even 
more important, none of these statements provides clarity about what conception might have 
been thought to have replaced Blackstone’s beyond the apparent willingness of Cushing and 
Adams to recognize a defense of truth in defamation actions. Marshall’s letter was closest to 
a general repudiation of the pernicious-tendency test in favor of something like absolute 
protection, but Lange and Powell acknowledge that “Marshall was not engaged in 
dispassionate constitutional analysis, and in addition he was writing under extreme time 
pressure. As a consequence the exact constitutional implications of his discussion of press 
freedom, a discussion which never explicitly invoked the First Amendment, are unclear.” Id. 
at 207 (footnote omitted). One might add that from the standpoint of original public 
meaning, the fact that there is so little evidence of a similar understanding of the First 
Amendment to be found in the public record makes this evidence suspect. 
 81. An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain 
Crimes Against the United States,” ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (1798). 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 55. 
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even the advocates of seditious libel to stomach.83 On the other hand, the Act did 
pass, which might suggest that the First Amendment was understood to provide 
little if any protection from after-the-fact punishment of expression beyond, 
perhaps, a requirement that seditious libel be proven false—assuming that this was 
understood to be a constitutional requirement and not a matter of legislative 
grace.84 Indeed, the federal courts uniformly rejected First Amendment attacks on 
the Sedition Act, relying on Blackstone’s conception, although the rulings came 
from Federalist judges politically aligned with the sponsors of the Act.85  
The Sedition Act provoked ferocious debate in and out of Congress. Supporters 
relied on Blackstone for the proposition that individuals were always answerable 
for seditious expression, while opponents, in addition to denying that the 
Constitution delegated power to Congress to punish seditious libel, claimed that 
inherent in a republican government was the right to criticize the government.86 
Madison, in his Virginia Report, denounced Blackstone’s distinction between prior 
restraints and after-the-fact punishment,87 and, although admitting his inability to 
identify “the proper boundary between the liberty and licentiousness of the press,”88 
Madison argued that representative governments “require a greater freedom of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. The House agreed to an amendment making truth a defense without recorded debate. 
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2134 (1798). Indeed, section 3 of the Act seemed to make falsity an 
element of the offense, and section 3 guaranteed the admissibility of evidence of truth: “[I]f 
any person shall be prosecuted under this act, for the writing or publishing any libel 
aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon trial of the cause, to give in evidence in 
his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel.” § 3, 1 
Stat. at 597. Even so, Justice Chase interpreted the Act to place a burden of establishing truth 
“to the marrow” on the defendant. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 642–43 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865). 
 84. The Act passed in the House by a vote of 44 to 41. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2171 
(1798). The Act seems to have been less controversial in the Senate; although the Senate’s 
debates were not recorded, the original version of the Act, without any defense of truth, 
passed by a vote of 18 to 6. See S. JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 527–28 (1798). The Senate 
later agreed to the bill, as amended by the House, without recorded vote. See id. at 537–38. 
 85. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 86–89; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: 
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 68–69 (2004); Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment 
Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 794–95, 799–800 (2008); Jenkins, supra note 63, at 189–96. 
 86. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 86–119 (1970); CURTIS, supra note 53, at 58–79, 94–100; FELDMAN, supra 
note 61, at 80–86, 89–100; LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 212–24; LEVY, supra note 
52, at 297–324; SMITH, supra note 53, at 131–50; STONE, supra note 85, at 36–45; Jay, supra 
note 85, at 794–99; Jenkins, supra note 63, at 171–83; Mayton, supra note 53, at 121–28; 
Rabban, supra note 53, at 849–52. For a nearly contemporaneous account of the debate, see 
2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. at 14–21 (1803). For 
statements in the House debates expressing views of the First Amendment inconsistent with 
Blackstone, see 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140–45 (1798) (Rep. Nicholas); id. at 2153–54 (Rep. 
Livingston); id. at 2160–61 (Rep. Gallatin). For statements in the House reflecting 
Blackstone, see id. at 2148 (Rep. Otis); id. at 2168–70 (Rep. Harper). 
 87. JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800 (1800), excerpted in 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 197, 214 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966). 
 88. Id. 
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animadversion than might be tolerated by the genius of such a government as that 
of Great Britain.”89 The Act’s supporters had a rejoinder; one of the obligations of 
citizenship in a republic, in their view, was to refrain from obstructing elected 
officials in the discharge of their duties, and defamation was thought to involve a 
breach of that obligation.90 To the extent that both sides of this debate can be said 
to reflect their own understanding of the original meaning of the First Amendment, 
it is not a stretch to say that this meaning was deeply contested. 
As the Supreme Court later observed, after the Sedition Act expired following 
the election of 1800, newly elected President Jefferson pardoned those convicted 
under the Act and Congress later repaid the fines that had been imposed under it, 
leading the Court to conclude that the judgment of history was against the 
constitutionality of the Act.91 It may be doubted, however, if the election of 1800 
can be fairly characterized as a referendum on the constitutionality of the Sedition 
Act. More likely, the election turned on divisions within the ranks of the Federalists 
having nothing to do with the Act.92 But even if the election of 1800 should be 
understood as a repudiation of Blackstonism, it is difficult to determine what 
conception of freedom of speech and of the press had replaced it.  
As we have seen, Madison was unable to offer any clarity on the extent of the 
right of free expression. This inability was not uncommon. For example, the author 
of what the Supreme Court has called “the most important early American edition 
of Blackstone’s Commentaries,”93 St. George Tucker, denounced Blackstone’s 
view, agreeing with Madison that republican government required broader 
protections, and yet he identified no clear boundary on First Amendment rights.94 
Indeed, it is far from clear that Tucker believed that republican governments must 
protect defamatory speech; Tucker approved of state-law remedies for defamation, 
and regarded the effect of the First Amendment simply as leaving these remedies in 
the hands of the states.95 Jefferson had a similar understanding.96 He even promoted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Id. at 215. For the classic judicial statement of the view that the republican form of 
government established in America necessitated a broader conception of freedom of speech, 
see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 90. James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The 
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 
169–76 (1999). 
 91. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1963). To similar effect, see 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 92. See, e.g., JAMES GRANT, JOHN ADAMS: PARTY OF ONE 421–27 (2005); DAVID 
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 536–52 (2001); 2 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 1038–59 (1962). 
 93. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008). On the influence of 
Tucker, see, for example, SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND 
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 263–72 (1999); CRAIG EVAN 
KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 38–47 (1993); 
and Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1111 (2006). 
 94. See 2 TUCKER, supra note 86, at app. 11–14, 30. 
 95. See id. at app. 28–30. 
 96. Jefferson wrote: 
Nor does the opinion of the unconstitutionality and consequent nullity of that 
law [the Sedition Act] remove all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of 
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seditious libel prosecutions of his opponents during his administration in state 
courts, and in one instance even by means of a federal prosecution based on 
common law principles.97 Thus, even if the Sedition Act controversy should be 
regarded as evidence of the demise of the Blackstonian conception for free speech 
and a free press for purposes of ascertaining the original public meaning of the First 
Amendment, it again is far from clear what conception of the founding generation 
had replaced it, other than perhaps the view that seditious libel should be left to the 
states. Indeed, another early commentator, even while attacking the 
constitutionality of the Sedition Act on the ground that it gave special rights to 
particular public officials, expressed the view that the law of seditious libel was 
consistent with the First Amendment.98 
C. The First Amendment’s Meaning in the Reconstruction Era 
It may be that the search for the First Amendment’s original meaning should not 
be confined to framing-era evidence. In Heller, for example, in an effort to construe 
the Second Amendment, the Court examined evidence of the public’s 
understanding of the Second Amendment throughout the nineteenth century.99 
Beyond that, the First Amendment became applicable to the states through the 
                                                                                                                 
slander which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth and falsehood in the 
US. The power to do that is fully possessed by the several state legislatures. It 
was reserved to them, and was denied to the general government, by the 
constitution according to our construction of it. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 1 THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND 
ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 279 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). For an elaboration on 
Jefferson’s views, see LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER 
SIDE 46–48 (1963). The same view was stated by opponents of the Sedition Act in the 
House. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2152 (1798) (Rep. Macon); id. at 2153 (Rep. Livingston); 
id. at 2163–64 (Rep. Gallatin). 
 97. See Paul Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson, Original Intent, and the Shaping of 
American Law: Learning Constitutional Law from the Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 62 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 77–80 (2006). In the federal prosecution, the Supreme Court 
eventually held that the federal courts have no common law power to punish crimes without 
considering any question under the First Amendment. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 32 (1814). 
 98. See JAMES SULLIVAN, A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 28–54 (1801). David Lange and Jefferson Powell 
have argued that the Sedition Act controversy should be regarded as a rejection of balancing 
in the First Amendment context because neither side of the debate spoke in terms of 
balancing. See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 222–23. This account may afford too 
much significance to a supposed omission; the failure of advocates of the Act to discuss 
balancing may reflect no more than an understanding that, under the common law, the 
balance had already been struck against speech amounting to seditious libel or otherwise 
having a bad tendency. The opposition to the Act may not have rejected balancing either; 
Tucker and Jefferson’s advocacy of state-law remedies as properly accommodating the 
relevant governmental and societal interests suggests that the lack of discussion of balancing 
on the part of opponents of the Act may instead reflect the view that the balance was one 
appropriately struck by the states rather than the federal government. 
 99. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2804–12 (2008). 
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Fourteenth Amendment,100 ratified in 1868.101 It may be that the public’s 
understanding of the Speech and Press Clauses at the time they were made 
applicable to the states is the appropriate point for assessing the meaning of the 
Speech and Press Clauses on the view that 1868 was the time at which the nation 
recommitted to constitutional protection for free speech and a free press.102 Indeed, 
by 1868 there were signs of evolution in the public’s understanding of free speech 
and a free press. 
Early in the nineteenth century, Blackstonism seemed alive and well. Despite 
the resolution of the Sedition Act controversy, the leading commentators in the first 
half of the nineteenth century hewed to Blackstone, explaining that the First 
Amendment preserved the common law and accordingly prohibited only prior 
restraints.103 Justice Story, for example, wrote that the view that “this amendment 
was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or print, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1937), overruled on other grounds 
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The question whether the Speech and Press 
Clauses were properly incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment is a controversial one, 
on which there is a vast literature. For some of the leading originalist defenses of 
incorporation, see AMAR, supra note 79, at 163–239; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 52, at 1089–
95; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57–91, 215–20 (1986); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of 
Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007). For some of the leading attacks on the historical case for 
incorporation, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155–89 (2d ed. 1997); DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND 
INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 27–36 (2003); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 228–39 (1965); Donald 
Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down that 
Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1574–82 (1996); Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. 
L. REV. 5 (1949); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009); George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007). For present purposes, it 
is unnecessary to enter this debate. Given that the Supreme Court has concluded that the 
First Amendment should be considered protected against the states by the Fourteenth, the 
relevant question for the current project is whether evidence of the public’s understanding of 
the First Amendment at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification aids in 
understanding the meaning of the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses. 
 101. See Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat. 708, 710 (July 28, 1868). 
 102. See Siegel, supra note 78, at 658–63. Other scholars have advanced similar 
arguments with respect to different provisions in the first eight amendments. See, e.g., 
AMAR, supra note 79, at 258–66 (Second Amendment); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption 
of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1085, 1136–53 (1995) (First Amendment Establishment Clause); Michael B. Rappaport, 
Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against 
Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 743–
57 (2008) (Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).  
 103. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 12–22 (1827); 3 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 731–33 (1833). 
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whatever he might please . . . is a supposition too wild to be indulged by any 
rational man.”104 Rejecting the view that the Blackstonian position was inconsistent 
with republican government, Story defended the criminalization of seditious libel 
under state law,105 although he expressed no view about whether the federal 
government could prohibit seditious libel.106 
Still, prior to the Civil War, there were unmistakable signs of movement from 
Blackstonism. Even Justice Story seems to have accepted that truth, at least in some 
circumstances, could be a defense to libel; he called the First Amendment “neither 
more nor less, than an expansion of the great doctrine, recently brought into 
operation in the law of libel, that every man shall be at liberty to publish what is 
true, with good motives and for justifiable ends.”107 Moreover, his agnosticism on 
the constitutionality of the Sedition Act does not appear to reflect the prevailing 
public understanding of the era; in 1840, Congress authorized the repayment of 
fines levied under the Sedition Act108 on the ground that the Act was 
unconstitutional.109 And, in the years leading to the Civil War and until the time of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification, there was increasing 
criticism in the North of efforts by the southern states to suppress progressive 
speech on the subject of race.110  
Nevertheless, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, 
developments in First Amendment jurisprudence had not been dramatic. In his 
1873 revision of Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, Holmes had little to say 
about the First Amendment other than to note a trend toward permitting truth as a 
defense in defamation actions.111 As for the Sedition Act, the treatise described it as 
“declaratory, and was intended to convey the sense of Congress, that in 
prosecutions of that kind it was the common right of the defendant to give the truth 
in evidence.”112 Throughout the nineteenth century, the bad-tendency test continued 
to predominate in thinking about the First Amendment, although it was understood 
to grant greater protection for expression on public affairs and matters of public 
concern.113  
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. 3 STORY, supra note 103, at 731–32. He also observed that “[t]he doctrine laid down 
by Mr. Justice Blackstone, respecting the liberty of the press, has not been repudiated (so far 
as is known) by any solemn decision of any of the state courts, in respect to their own 
municipal jurisprudence.” Id. at 741. 
 105. Id. at 732–33, 738–43. 
 106. See id. at 743. 
 107. Id. at 732–33. 
 108. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 802 (1840). 
 109. See CONG. GLOBE, 26TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 411 (1840). 
 110. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 79, at 234–42; CURTIS, supra note 53, at 241–99; 
FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 121–52; Jay, supra note 85, at 805–10. 
 111. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *17–25 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. 
ed., 1873).  
 112. Id. at *24 (emphasis in original). 
 113. See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 177–210 
(1999). 
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The leading treatise of the Reconstruction era was by Thomas Cooley, and the 
Supreme Court in Heller accurately described it as “massively popular.”114 Cooley 
unambiguously rejected the Blackstonian view of the First Amendment: 
[T]he mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is 
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be 
uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the 
press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself 
a byword if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, 
the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless 
publications.115 
Cooley also objected to the common law of seditious libel as inconsistent with 
republican government.116 Yet, Cooley characterized truth as a defense to libel only 
“if published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely what showing 
shall establish good motives and justifiable occasion must be settled by future 
decisions.”117 Indeed, Cooley seems to have thought that the First Amendment 
protected expression only “so long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested 
by such standards as the law affords.”118 Cooley seems to have believed that for 
sufficient reason, the legislature could authorize additional restrictions for reasons 
analogous to those thought sufficient to support liability under traditional common 
law standards: 
The constitutional freedom of speech and of the press must mean a 
freedom as broad as existed when the constitution which guarantees it 
was adopted, and it would not be in the power of the legislature to 
restrict it, except in those cases of publications injurious to private 
character, or public morals or safety, which come strictly within the 
reasons of civil or criminal liability at the common law, but where, 
nevertheless, the common law as we have adopted it failed to provide a 
remedy. It certainly could not be said that freedom of speech was 
violated by a law which should make imputing the want of chastity to a 
female actionable without proof of special damage; for the charge is 
one of grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy demanding 
protection to the communication, and the case is strictly analogous to 
many other cases where the common law made the party responsible 
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for his false accusations. The constitutional provisions do not prevent 
the modification of the common-law rules of liability for libels and 
slanders, but they would not permit bringing new cases within those 
rules when they do not rest upon the same reasons.119  
The Fourteenth Amendment ushered in no great change in the protection that 
state law offered for speech. For one thing, no discernable change in the scope of 
protection afforded expression in defamation actions under state law followed the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggesting that the First Amendment 
was not thought to have dramatic implications for state-law regulation of speech.120 
For another, as late as 1907, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court 
characterized the First Amendment as simply a rule against prior restraint,121 
adding: “The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the 
subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.”122 Yet, little 
more than a decade later, the Court had repudiated its previous embrace of 
Blackstone, in an opinion by the very same Justice Holmes.123 There seems to have 
been more than a little uncertainty about the meaning of the First Amendment 
throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. 
D. The Common Law of Free Speech 
By now, it should be plain that the evidence regarding the original meaning of 
the Speech and Press Clauses is anything but easy to sort out.  
As we have seen, the First Amendment’s use of the definite article suggests that 
the Speech and Press Clauses refer to a preexisting legal concept. The only well-
recognized framing-era account of the freedom of the press was Blackstone’s. Yet, 
Blackstone’s account seemed never to take root in America, and, in any event, even 
if an accurate account of the freedom of the press, may not have described the 
freedom of speech. Moreover, the First Amendment’s reference to prevailing 
common law standards is far more indirect than the Seventh Amendment’s. 
The Sedition Act provided the first occasion in which there was serious public 
debate about the meaning of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The 
debate over the Act was intense; there was anything but a consensus about the 
meaning of the First Amendment. Jefferson’s victory might be thought a rejection 
of Blackstone, but it seems that neither he nor any other prominent critic of the 
Sedition Act took seriously the notion that seditious libel was inconsistent with 
republican government; and there was little evident disapproval of state-law 
seditious libel prosecutions in the wake of Jefferson’s victory. Still, the trend 
toward the recognition of truth as a defense to defamation in the nineteenth century 
suggests that Blackstonian standards were never taken as authoritative, and if 
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Cooley’s treatise is any indication, seditious libel was under serious assault still by 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Yet, as late as 1907, the 
Supreme Court was repeating the Blackstonian formulation. 
In the face of such deeply conflicting evidence, most scholars of the First 
Amendment have despaired of producing any coherent originalist account of the 
Speech and Press Clauses, at least when examining the question in terms of the 
intentions of the framers.124 About the only originalist account to emerge came 
from Robert Bork, who, despite admitting that “[t]he framers seem to have had no 
coherent theory of free speech,”125 argued in these pages that “[c]onstitutional 
protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political” and that 
“within that category of speech we ordinarily call political, there should be no 
constitutional obstruction to laws making criminal any speech that advocates 
forcible overthrow of the government or the violation of any law.”126 
At the time he advanced his proposal, then-Professor Bork thought that the only 
legitimate methods of constitutional interpretation involved reliance on the 
intentions of the framers or inferring rights from the structure of the government 
established by the Constitution.127 The matter looks rather different from the 
standpoint of original public meaning, however.128 As we have seen, no framing-
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era source describes the freedom of the press or free speech in terms of political 
speech that stops short of advocating violence. Blackstone ruled out prior restraints 
in their totality—whether for political or nonpolitical writings—but thought 
liability could be imposed after publication even for political speech if it was 
defamatory or had some other “pernicious tendency.”129 Even though undiluted 
Blackstonism may well be inconsistent with the original meaning of the First 
Amendment, the bad-tendency test, as we have also seen, remained in vogue 
throughout the nineteenth century, and it offered nothing like absolute protection 
for political speech. Indeed, given the breadth of the bad-tendency test, it is 
innocuous speech, not political speech, that offers the best case for protection under 
framing-era standards. While there is some evidence that during the nineteenth 
century the concept of seditious libel fell into disrepute, this is far from an 
understanding of special constitutional protection for political speech. 
In terms of original public meaning, Bork’s view that advocacy of illegal 
conduct is without protection fares somewhat better—it seems a classic instance of 
punishing speech with a “pernicious tendency” in the Blackstonian tradition.130 Yet, 
Blackstone’s bad-tendency test is broad enough to sustain the Sedition Act itself—
defamatory criticism directed at public officials surely could produce contempt, if 
not apathy, toward the political process of a type that might be thought undesirable 
in a republic. Indeed, we have seen that the Sedition Act was defended on these 
grounds.131 Still, whatever one thinks about the constitutionality of the Sedition Act 
as an original matter, by the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
its consistency with the general understanding of free speech and a free press was 
open to great doubt. 
An originalist might argue that the evidence of the First Amendment’s 
meaning—at least by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—
suggests no more than protection for the type of political speech that amounted to 
seditious libel, while otherwise preserving the bad-tendency test. This, after all, 
pretty much describes Cooley’s account.132 But even this overstates things. After 
all, truthful but defamatory speech might be thought to have a bad tendency—
Blackstone certainly thought it advisable to avoid the social friction that could 
result from defamation of this character—yet the virtues and vices of at least some 
types of bad-tendency speech seem to have been rebalanced between the era of 
Blackstone and Cooley. Blackstone’s “pernicious tendency” test, after all, reflects a 
balancing of competing interests; it is the “pernicious tendency” of defamatory and 
other types of actionable speech that justified limiting “[e]very freeman[’s] . . . 
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public.”133 Yet, by 
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1868, not all expression with a “pernicious tendency” was beyond the scope of 
permissible “freedom”—the emergence of the defense of truth in defamation 
actions makes that clear. 
Thus, the 1868 meaning of free speech and a free press was somewhat different 
than protection for speech that had no “bad tendency”—or at least a stronger 
showing of bad tendency had become required to overcome the speaker’s liberty 
interests. Indeed, Cooley’s account quite explicitly recognized both the liberty 
interest in speaking and writing free from liability, and the countervailing interests 
that justified the imposition of liability, in some circumstances, for speech and 
writings.134 Thus, the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clause reflected an 
effort to identify the bounds of “freedom” in terms of an assessment of competing 
interests.135 From 1791 to 1868, however, the balance between those competing 
interests was not static. Indeed, the balance may have started moving as early as the 
Zenger trial and seems to have been still evolving at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification, at least if Cooley’s uncertainty about the reach of the 
defense of truth in defamation actions is any indication.136 
Thus, the difficulties in identifying the original meaning of the First Amendment 
are a function of the reality that the meaning of free speech and a free press was 
something of a moving target in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
common law meaning, at least of a free press, had been inherited from Blackstone’s 
England, but that concept never really took root in America. From the Zenger trial 
to the Sedition Act, there was a march away from Blackstone’s standards for free 
speech and a free press in America—as the steady movement toward recognizing 
truth as a defense demonstrates. That is not to say that the public meaning of free 
speech and a free press was anything close to libertarian—the bad-tendency test 
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was firmly established at the start of the twentieth century. Yet, it seems that even 
the bad-tendency test never fully described the American conception of free speech 
and a free press. Truthful but defamatory speech might have a bad tendency, yet 
there was steady movement toward protecting it. 
If the concepts of a free speech and a free press were in flux, this was nothing 
unusual. As Bernadette Meyler has demonstrated, it was widely understood at the 
time of the framing that the common law had a dynamic, evolutionary, and 
frequently indeterminate character.137 In this respect, the law of free speech and a 
free press was no exception. The evolving character of the balance between 
competing interests embodied in the concepts of “freedom of speech” and a “free 
press” meant that these concepts were understood to develop through the familiar 
common law process of reasoned elaboration—the same process that had produced 
significant changes in the law of defamation between the founding and 1868.  
Indeed, when Justice Holmes opined in the Schenck case that First Amendment 
protection turns on “whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent,”138 he was similarly 
engaged in a kind of balance between speech and the government’s interest in 
preventing “substantive evils.” By the time of his dissent in the Abrams case, 
Holmes’s balancing was more overt, and it led him to frame the test in a more 
demanding fashion:  
But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle 
of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present 
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants 
Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private 
rights are not concerned.139 
Since Abrams, the Court has continued to recalibrate the balance between liberty 
and regulation and now requires an imminent threat of substantive evil to justify a 
prohibition of speech thought to advocate unlawful conduct.140 Yet, long after the 
Court stopped referring to the “bad tendency” of speech, First Amendment 
jurisprudence continued to partake of balancing. The Court explained its evolution 
from a doctrine that permitted the government to prohibit the advocacy of violent 
conduct to one that permitted the state to prohibit advocacy of violence only when 
directed toward producing imminent violent conduct on the ground that the former 
poses a less serious threat: “[T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety 
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as 
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”141 Thus, a 
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process of assessing the liberty interest in free speech against the extent of the 
government’s interest in regulating the speech remains at the core of free speech 
doctrine, even as the Court has come to demand more compelling governmental 
interests to justify content-based government regulation. This doctrinal evolution 
should be unsurprising; the value of free discussion and debate is surely more 
evident in today’s America than in Blackstone’s England, and the dangers of 
seditious speech more remote, producing a more speech-protective balance.142 But 
once the original meaning of “the freedom of speech, and of the press” is 
understood to involve a balance between liberty and order, a jurisprudence that 
strikes that balance in light of the contemporary understanding of the relative 
importance of the competing interests is consistent with even an originalist 
understanding of the freedom of speech.  
Indeed, no less an originalist than Robert Bork took just this view of the original 
public meaning of constitutional text. Bork explained that it was irrelevant, in his 
view, whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to outlaw 
segregation inasmuch as the equality principle they placed in the text came to be 
understood as inconsistent with segregation.143 In this approach to originalist 
interpretation, Judge Bork is joined by many contemporary advocates of original-
public-meaning originalism, who observe that because it is the original meaning of 
constitutional text that is interpretively binding, not the intentions, motivations, or 
understandings of those who crafted or agreed to that text, originalism permits the 
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judge to apply principles embodied in constitutional text in light of contemporary 
understandings as to how the constitutional principle is best applied, rather than 
treating framing-era practice or understandings as to how text would be applied as 
binding.144 
Thus, even in originalist terms, most likely the best understanding of the Speech 
and Press Clauses is that they were to create a common law of free speech and a 
free press in which competing interests would be put to the balance, rather than 
dictating particular outcomes to the process of balancing. In terms of original 
meaning, in short, the purposivist account of the First Amendment is suspect. 
Pragmatic balancing seems more consistent with the framing-era meaning of free 
speech and a free press. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS 
As we have seen, history suggests that the freedom of speech and of the press 
can be understood as reflecting a balance between liberty and order—this is the 
common law legacy of the bad-tendency test. On the purposivist account, however, 
something has fundamentally changed in First Amendment jurisprudence. It is not 
simply that we understand the balance between liberty and order differently today 
than in the framing era; instead, the purposivist account contends that the 
government’s motive has become central to First Amendment jurisprudence. On 
the purposivist account, as we have seen, a sufficient likelihood of a governmental 
motive to suppress disfavored speech is reason enough to invalidate a challenged 
regulation.145 
Although the purposivists have to date made no effort to square their position 
with original meaning, originalism may well not be fatal to their account of First 
Amendment doctrine. As we have seen, by the framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a consensus was emerging that seditious libel was inconsistent with 
the First Amendment. Purposivists could argue that the hostility to seditious libel 
was ultimately rooted in the view that government may not suppress disfavored 
speech or speakers—the conceptual core of the purposivist account. On this view, 
purposivism simply reflects the natural evolution of a principle anchored in the 
original understanding of free speech, at least as of 1868. Thus, although, as we 
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have seen, there is a strong case to be made that a First Amendment jurisprudence 
that abjures balancing is inconsistent with original meaning; this objection may not 
be sufficient to doom the purposivist enterprise. The matter is surely not free from 
doubt; in the recent Stevens decision, for example, the Court denied that First 
Amendment protection “extend[s] only to categories of speech that survive an ad 
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”146 If the Court is correct that 
First Amendment jurisprudence reflects a categorical approach rather than 
balancing, then the purposivists may be onto something. 
To assess the purposivist theory of the First Amendment, accordingly, a test 
case is in order. After all, in science, a theory gains acceptance if it makes testable 
predictions that are later borne out.147 We should expect no less from theories about 
legal doctrine. The relationship between the First Amendment and the 
government’s power to investigate potential lawbreaking provides just the kind of 
test case needed to assess the purposivists’ claims. 
A. The Problem of First Amendment Investigations 
Robert Watts was convicted of threatening the life of the President for saying at 
a public rally, “I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got 
to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make 
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”148 The Court 
reversed his conviction, explaining that “a statute . . . which makes criminal a form 
of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment 
clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is 
constitutionally protected speech.”149 Watts has come to stand for the proposition 
that even speech that is reasonably understood to convey a threat retains 
constitutional protection unless it goes beyond the bounds of rhetorical hyperbole 
and reflects a serious intention to commit an act of unlawful violence.150 Absent 
this kind of “true threat,” speech advocating unlawful conduct or violence is 
protected unless a breach of the peace is imminent.151 
Thus, under the First Amendment, Watts could not be punished for what he said 
about the President. To be sure, Watts’s statement was not in the highest tradition 
of public discussion and debate, but as the Court observed, “[t]he language of the 
political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”152 Still, sometimes 
vituperative and abusive rhetoric is merely hyperbolic or inexact, but sometimes it 
may betray the speaker’s intention to break the law. Had Watts subsequently killed 
the President, it is plain that his earlier statement, even though constitutionally 
protected when made, could be used as evidence of his criminal intent.153 Without 
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the benefit of hindsight, however, it is impossible to know whether Watts was 
being hyperbolic. 
Accordingly, a question unanswered by Watts is whether Watts’s statement, 
though in itself protected by the First Amendment, could be the trigger for an 
investigation to determine whether Watts posed a genuine threat to the President.154 
Could Watts’s statement, at a minimum, be placed in a law-enforcement database 
so that, if a serious attempt were subsequently made on the life of the President, his 
statement could be used as an investigative lead? Judge Posner, for one, thinks he 
knows the answer: “The FBI always has investigated people who advocate or 
threaten to commit serious violations of federal law, even if the violations are not 
imminent; and it always will.”155 As examples, he hypothesized “a new sect of 
religious fanatics [that] announced that unless Chicagoans renounce their sinful 
ways it may become necessary to poison the city’s water supply, or a newly 
organized group of white supremacists [that] vowed to take revenge on Chicago for 
electing a black mayor,” or “the leaders of a newly formed organization of Puerto 
Rican separatists [that] went around Chicago making speeches to the effect that, if 
the United States does not grant Puerto Rico independence soon, it will be 
necessary to begin terrorist activities on the mainland United States.”156 None of 
these instances of speech could be criminalized, but all of them, Judge Posner 
opined, warrant investigation so as not to “trifl[e] with the public safety.”157 
Judge Posner’s examples identify the kind of statements that, though 
constitutionally protected, seem to merit some inquiry to determine if the speakers 
are likely to cross the line into criminal conspiracy. The justification for 
investigating constitutionally protected activity, however, is not based wholly on 
hypotheticals. In early January 2000, two of the participants in the September 11 
terrorist attacks, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid el Mihdhar, were surveilled by 
intelligence agents in Kuala Lumpur, where intercepted communications had 
indicated that a meeting of an “operational cadre” of terrorists was to take place.158 
                                                                                                                 
(quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)) (“[I]t has never 
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct 
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means 
of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”).  
 154. Indeed, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), suggests that 
sometimes the question whether speech was protected will turn on subsequent events:  
The lengthy addresses [on which damages liability had been premised] 
generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to support 
and respect each other, and to realize the political and economic power 
available to them. In the course of those pleas, strong language was used. If that 
language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would 
be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that 
unlawful conduct. 
Id. at 928. 
 155. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1002, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 
1984) (en banc). 
 156. Id. at 1014. 
 157. Id. 
 158. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE UNITED STATES 181 (2004).  
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On January 8, surveillance teams reported that three suspected participants in the 
meetings had left Kuala Lumpur for Bangkok, including Mihdhar and another 
individual identified as “Alhazmi.”159 Several weeks later, CIA agents learned that 
on January 15, Hazmi had left Bangkok for Los Angeles.160 In fact, Hazmi and 
Mihdhar flew to Los Angeles together on that date.161 After they arrived in Los 
Angeles, Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, 
one of the most prominent mosques in Southern California, where they made a 
number of acquaintances.162 They may have been aided by an imam at the mosque, 
Fahad al Thumairy, who was well known for his adherence to a radical 
fundamentalist ideology.163 Had counterterrorism agents commenced surveilling al 
Thumairy or the mosque after learning that suspected terrorists who might find the 
mosque or its imam ideologically congenial had arrived in Los Angeles, they might 
well have located the terrorists long before the attack, perhaps preventing it.164 But, 
of course, such an investigation would have been triggered by al Thumairy’s 
statements reflecting his sympathy with radical fundamentalist ideology, which are 
protected by the First Amendment. 
Politically motivated terrorism provides a particularly vivid example of the case 
for intelligence-gathering investigations predicated upon expression that is 
protected by the First Amendment. Obtaining intelligence about impending attacks 
is critical, as the threat from terrorists who are willing to give their lives has made 
conventional forms of deterrence through after-the-fact punishment largely 
ineffective.165 Indeed, since the September 11 attacks, the FBI has engaged in 
surveillance of mosques as part of its counterterrorism efforts.166  
Yet another example involves Scott Roeder, the convicted killer of Dr. George 
Tiller, a provider of late-term abortions.167 Several years earlier, Roeder had posted 
on the website of an antiabortion group a rather chilling admonition: “Tiller is the 
concentration camp ‘Mengele’ of our day and needs to be stopped before he and 
those who protect him bring judgment upon on our nation.”168 Roeder’s posting 
likely enjoyed First Amendment protection; it seems to fall short of a true threat or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 181–82. 
 162. Id. at 216.  
 163. Id. at 216–17. 
 164. When Hazmi and Mihdhar moved to the San Diego area in February, they 
frequented the Islamic Center of San Diego and a number of other area mosques, where they 
made many acquaintances. Id. at 219–21. During their stay in San Diego, they contacted a 
number of flight instructors seeking to learn how to fly Boeing jets, which struck at least one 
instructor whom they consulted as indicating that they were either “joking or dreaming.” Id. 
at 222. 
 165. See, e.g., GREGORY F. TREVERTON, RAND CORP., INTELLIGENCE FOR AN AGE OF 
TERROR 36–39 (2009). 
 166. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and 
Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1228–31 (2004). 
 167. See Monica Davey, Abortion Foe Is Found Guilty of First-Degree Murder in 
Doctor’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A12. 
 168. Susan Saulny & Monica Davey, Seeking Clues on Suspect in Shooting of Doctor, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1, A14. 
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a call to imminent violence. Still, had the posting led investigators to interview 
Roeder, perhaps he would have been deterred. At a minimum, had the posting been 
monitored by law-enforcement officials and placed in an investigative file, it would 
have been useful as an investigative lead after the shooting.  
The justification for collecting information about activities protected by the First 
Amendment, however, extends to cases far more prosaic than the plots of 
international terrorists or the murder of abortion providers. Consider a police 
department that wishes to videotape public demonstrations in order to improve 
training and tactics, to deter police misconduct or document it if it occurs, and to 
guard against false claims of police misconduct as well.169 Videotaping under these 
circumstances involves collecting information about activities that are protected by 
the First Amendment since the videotaping will necessarily reflect the protected 
activities of demonstrators. 
For its part, the U.S. Department of Justice takes the position that it is free to 
undertake investigations on the basis of expression that enjoys First Amendment 
protection. The guidelines governing the FBI’s initiation of federal criminal 
investigations provide:  
A full investigation of a group or organization may be initiated . . . if 
there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably 
indicates that the group or organization may have engaged or may be 
engaged in, or may have or may be engaged in planning or preparation 
or provision of support for . . . furthering political or social goals 
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a 
violation of federal criminal law . . . .170  
This standard is well short of the requirement of imminent unlawful conduct or a 
true threat that lacks constitutional protection; indeed, the FBI has opined:  
Despite the high standard for prohibiting free speech or punishing those 
who engage in it, the law does not preclude FBI employees from 
observing and collecting any of the forms of protected speech and 
considering its content—as long as those activities are done for a valid 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295, 
2000 WL 709485, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2000) (declining to answer similar questions due 
to lack of ripeness). 
 170. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 23 (Sept. 29, 2008). The guidelines add: “These 
Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining information on United 
States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First 
Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.” Id. at 13. Accordingly, it appears that as long as there is some law-
enforcement justification for an investigation, it is permitted even if it involves monitoring 
activities otherwise protected by the First Amendment. These guidelines represent an 
incremental relaxation of the standard for initiating an investigation. For a discussion of the 
evolution of the guidelines governing FBI investigations, see Allison Jones, Note, The 2008 
FBI Guidelines: Contradiction of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 139–50, 
164–69 (2009). 
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law enforcement or national security purpose and conducted in a 
manner that does not unduly infringe upon the ability of the speaker to 
deliver his or her message.171 
Nevertheless, history reflects a serious risk of abuse in investigations based on 
the protected speech of the targets. In 1936, President Roosevelt first authorized the 
FBI to operate a domestic intelligence-gathering program targeting what were 
thought to be subversive activities.172 The resulting program was wildly overbroad, 
investigating a wide variety of political activity with little apparent relationship to 
illegal activity, such as a decades-long investigation of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, and investigations of then-Senator Adlai 
Stevenson III, then-Representative Abner Mikva, and a host of critics of the FBI 
itself.173 Indeed, groups and individuals were often targeted for investigation based 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 26 
(Dec. 16, 2008). The Department of Justice has, however, placed some additional restrictions 
on the collection and dissemination of information about activity that is protected by the 
First Amendment. The regulations governing federally funded intelligence gathering under 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act provide that a law-enforcement agency 
“shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual only if 
there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity 
and the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 23.20(a) 
(2009). The regulations also provide that an agency  
shall not collect or maintain criminal intelligence information about the 
political, religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual 
or any group, association, corporation, business partnership, or other 
organization unless such information directly relates to criminal conduct or 
activity and there is reasonable suspicion that the subject of the information is 
or may be involved in criminal conduct or activity. 
 Id. § 23.20(b). “Reasonable suspicion” is defined as “a basis to believe that there is a 
reasonable possibility that an individual or organization is involved in a definable criminal 
activity or enterprise.” Id. § 23.20(c). These regulations, however, appear to be based on a 
concern about the dissemination of information rather than its collection. In response to a 
comment that the reasonable-suspicion standard was unwarranted and that information need 
only be “necessary and relevant to an agency’s lawful purpose,” the Department of Justice 
“agreed that [while] the standard suggested is appropriate for investigative or other 
information files maintained for use by or within an agency, the potential for national 
dissemination of information in intelligence information systems, coupled with the lack of 
access by subjects to challenge the information, justifies the reasonable suspicion standard.” 
Final Revision to the Office of Justice Programs, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating 
Policies, 58 Fed. Reg. 48448, 48451 (Sept. 16, 1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 23). For 
a helpful summary of the department’s policies regarding investigative activities and the 
First Amendment, see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF 
THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIONS OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC ADVOCACY GROUPS 5–23 (Sept. 2010). 
 172. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: 1976 U.S. SENATE REPORT ON 
ILLEGAL WIRETAPS AND DOMESTIC SPYING BY THE FBI, CIA AND NSA 25 (Red & Black 
Publishers 2007) (1976). 
 173. Id. at 12–14. 
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on little more than their ideological sympathies.174 The program included efforts to 
prevent individuals from joining left-wing organizations or participating in protest 
activities, by means such as sending letters rife with false allegations to the 
employers and spouses of protesters.175 Efforts were made as well to intimidate Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. by sending him a recording of an adulterous tryst in his 
motel room in an implicit threat to destroy his marriage.176 Undercover agents 
infiltrated a variety of left-wing groups,177 and infiltrators made a special effort to 
disrupt the protest activities of leftist groups during the Vietnam War.178 For 
example, agents posing as protest organizers sent false instructions to protesters 
about planned events in an effort to produce chaos.179 
In response to civil rights and Vietnam protests, local police departments also 
participated in efforts to discredit the protesters as communists.180 Protests were 
photographed or filmed,181 and the resulting pictures—accompanied by charges that 
the participants were subversives—were then provided to the House Internal 
Security Committee.182 Photography and surveillance were conducted in an overt 
fashion in an effort to intimidate protesters.183 Undercover infiltrators encouraged 
leftist groups to engage in illegal activities in the hope of discrediting them and 
developing a pretext for arrests.184 Information of dubious reliability was leaked 
labeling protesters as communists or subversives.185 Since the September 11 
attacks, some of these tactics seem to have reemerged, as investigations have been 
launched targeting groups for no apparent reason other than their involvement in 
antiwar activities.186 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. See id. at 39–46, 52–62. 
 175. See id. at 14. 
 176. See id. at 15. 
 177. Id. at 125–27. 
 178. See id. at 66–67. 
 179. See id. at 13–14. 
 180. See FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND POLICE 
REPRESSION IN URBAN AMERICA 65–67, 69–76 (1990). 
 181. See id. at 67–69. 
 182. Id. at 73–74. 
 183. See id. at 107, 162–65, 202–04, 260–61. 
 184. See id. at 111–12, 129–30, 164, 169, 173–80, 256. 
 185. See id. at 93–96, 138–41. 
 186. See, e.g., ATHAN THEOHARIS, THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY: THE FAILED 
RELATIONS AMONG U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 253–58 (2007); see also Eric Lichtblau, 
Documents Reveal Scope of U.S. Database on Antiwar Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, 
at A18 (“A department spokesman said Thursday that the ‘questionable data collection’ [of 
antiwar demonstrators] had led to a tightening of military procedures to ensure that only 
information relevant to terrorism and other threats was collected.”); cf. Charlie Savage & 
Scott Shane, Intelligence Was Improperly Collected on American Citizens, Documents Show, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A29 (describing the release of documents concerning “cases 
in the last several years in which the [Department of Homeland Security’s] intelligence 
office improperly collected information about American citizens or lawful United States 
residents”). In a recent report concerning FBI investigations of certain domestic groups 
engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment, the Department of Justice’s 
Inspector General concluded that although the FBI had not targeted these groups because of 
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Lower courts have been anything but uniform in their approach to First 
Amendment claims attacking investigations that are based on the protected 
expression of the targets.187 Most courts have held that such investigations require 
                                                                                                                 
their protected activities, some of the investigations were based on weak predication and 
involved unwarranted investigative tactics or were unreasonably prolonged. See OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 171, at 186–88.  
 187. One might expect other constitutional provisions to come into play when it comes to 
constitutional regulation of investigations directed at expressive activities protected by the 
First Amendment—most obviously, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Indeed, one line of cases holds that warrants 
authorizing the seizure of materials that enjoy First Amendment protection must adequately 
circumscribe the discretion of officers who execute the warrant in order to minimize the risk 
that a search or seizure will burden First Amendment rights. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 
476, 485–86 (1965) (warrant authorizing seizure of records relating to Communist Party); 
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731–33 (1961) (warrant authorizing seizure of 
obscene materials). The Court has also held that the seizure of alleged obscene materials (to 
prevent their dissemination on the basis of probable cause) violates the Fourth Amendment 
because such a seizure prevents dissemination of materials not yet adjudicated obscene. See 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62–67 (1989). These cases, however, have 
produced no general set of regulations governing search and seizure of expressive material; 
the Court also held that applications and warrants to search for and seize expressive 
materials for evidentiary purposes are governed by ordinary Fourth Amendment standards. 
See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873–75 (1986) (warrant to seize obscene 
materials); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563–67 (1978) (warrant to search 
newspaper for photos documenting illegal conduct at a demonstration).  
  The most important hurdle to Fourth Amendment regulation, however, is that most 
investigative conduct does not amount to a “search” or “seizure” subject to regulation under 
the Fourth Amendment. For example, an interview of the target of an investigation is not 
subject to Fourth Amendment regulation as long as the target’s freedom to leave or 
otherwise terminate the encounter is not circumscribed. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 
536 U.S. 194, 200–06 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–37 (1991). Nor is the 
Fourth Amendment implicated by surveillance of a suspect in public places even if enhanced 
by technological means. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–50 (1989); United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282–85 (1983). Undercover officers are not engaged in a 
search or seizure when they interact with targets, even by accepting an invitation into a 
target’s residence or place of business, and even if they record their conversations. See 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748–54 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749–51, 753–
54 (1952). This rule is applicable even when undercover officers are investigating expressive 
activities such as the distribution of books or films. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 
467–71 (1985). Nor is the Fourth Amendment implicated when investigators acquire 
information from third parties about the activities of the target; the Court reasons that there is 
no expectation of privacy with respect to information one discloses to third parties. See SEC 
v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 
(1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Some lower courts have 
recognized a constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause that restricts the 
government’s ability to require individuals to disclose sensitive personal information without 
adequate justification, see, e.g., Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 877–81 (9th Cir. 2008), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (No. 09-530), a rule that produces some regulation. But 
this doctrine places no limitations on the government’s ability to acquire such information 
from investigative targets voluntarily or from third parties. 
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no more than a good-faith or rational law-enforcement interest supporting the 
investigation,188 while a handful have imposed various formulations of strict 
scrutiny on such investigations because of what is thought to be their chilling effect 
on the exercise of First Amendment rights.189 Most scholars to address the issue 
have argued for some form of heightened judicial scrutiny of such First 
Amendment investigations because of their ability to chill the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.190 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. See United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 748 (9th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Davila, 
125 F.3d 148, 160–63 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696–705 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1014–16 (7th Cir. 
1984) (en banc); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 
F.2d 1030, 1040–63 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J.); id. at 1071–72 (Robinson, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253, 256–57 (2d Cir. 
1974) (per curiam); see also Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that detention and search of citizens reentering the country after attending a 
conference on Islam abroad was not an impermissible burden on First Amendment 
associational rights in light of intelligence suggesting that the conference might have 
involved terrorists); cf. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 800–02 
(7th Cir. 2001) (opining that the First Amendment imposes no requirement that 
investigations of protected activities be based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct); 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 342–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (following 
Alliance). The reader should know that the author represented the City of Chicago in the 
2001 Alliance case. 
 189. See Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (strict 
scrutiny); Local 491, Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 
1271, 1293–96 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (substantial relevance); Words of Faith Fellowship, Inc. v. 
Rutherford County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 329 F. Supp. 2d 675, 688–89 (W.D.N.C. 2004) 
(requiring content neutrality and narrow tailoring); Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United 
States, 752 F. Supp. 1505, 1513–16 (D. Ariz. 1990) (strict scrutiny); White v. Davis, 533 
P.2d 222, 228–32 (Cal. 1975) (same); see also Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 506–11 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (exercising judicial review of National Security Letters that required 
disclosure of electronic communication transaction records), vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 2006); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of 
Thornton, 44 P.2d 1044, 1059 (Colo. 2002) (adversarial hearing required prior to execution 
of warrant to search bookstore) (applying Colorado Constitution). 
 190. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, 
Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 646–55 (2004); Matthew 
Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and 
the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 234, 288–99 (2007); 
Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 
142–75 (2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: 
First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 786–97 
(2008). Tom Lininger has also expressed similar concerns with respect to investigations of 
religious groups based on their beliefs and religious activities. See Lininger, supra note 166, 
at 1232–37. Without quite taking a position on the issue, Eugene Volokh has expressed 
skepticism that the potential chilling effect of investigations on First Amendment activities is 
a sufficient reason for circumscribing them. See Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is 
It “McCarthyism”? When Is It Proper?, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1442–49 (2005). Judge 
Posner, unsurprisingly, takes a clear position, arguing that the costs of terrorism and other 
serious crimes justify granting the government broad leeway to engage in intelligence 
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Whether the government can undertake an investigation based on the protected 
speech of the investigative target presents a classic case, on the purposivist account, 
for strict scrutiny. As we have seen, for the purposivists, when the government is 
free to impose special burdens on disfavored speech or speakers, the case for strict 
scrutiny is clearest.191 The chilling effect of being targeted for investigation is 
surely the kind of special burden that the purposivist account argues cannot be 
placed on disfavored speech or speakers. To be sure, a purposivist could claim that 
there is little risk of improper motivation when the government merely investigates 
to determine whether there has been a violation of a generally applicable law, but 
history suggests that such a claim would be unrealistic. Indeed, we will see that 
First Amendment doctrine recognizes the type of chilling effect at stake in the First 
Amendment investigation as legally cognizable. Thus, absent a regime that places 
meaningful limits on the ability of investigators to target disfavored speech or 
speakers, the purposivist account requires strict judicial scrutiny of First 
Amendment investigations. Strict scrutiny, in turn, is a demanding test, requiring 
that the government demonstrate that its challenged conduct advances a compelling 
governmental interest through the least restrictive means.192 Thus, the First 
Amendment investigation presents a good test of the purposivist account; this is 
one area in which the difference between the purposivists and the pragmatists is far 
more than academic.193 
B. The Doctrinal Basis for Assessing First Amendment  
Investigations Through Balancing 
In Wayte v. United States,194 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of the federal government’s “passive enforcement” policy targeting for prosecution 
only those individuals who had advised the Selective Service of their failure to 
register for the draft.195 The Court concluded that the policy involved no 
impermissible discrimination against those who protested the registration 
requirement—and therefore did not violate the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—reasoning that “[e]ven if the passive 
policy had a discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government 
intended such a result. . . . [P]etitioner has not shown that the Government 
                                                                                                                 
gathering even though it may burden activities protected by the First Amendment. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 301–02 (2003); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 
182–96 (2005). 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 8–9. 
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). For an elaboration of the character of strict scrutiny in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, see 1 SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 4:2–:26; Volokh, supra note 22, 
at 2418–24. 
 193. The present discussion is limited to investigations occurring within the United 
States. More complicated issues arise with respect to the extraterritorial reach of the First 
Amendment. See generally Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free 
Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1579–98 (2010). 
 194. 470 U.S. 598 (1985). 
 195. Id. at 600–03. 
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prosecuted him because of his protest activities.”196 The Court also rejected a First 
Amendment defense on the ground that the passive enforcement policy imposed 
only an incidental burden on speech that was justified by the government’s interest 
in enforcing the draft laws in a manner that “promoted prosecutorial efficiency,” 
utilized “strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to 
comply,” and was “an effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since 
failing to proceed against publicly known offenders would encourage others to 
violate the law.”197 
At first blush, Wayte seems inconsistent with the purposivist account of First 
Amendment doctrine. After all, any investigation of draft protesters involves a risk 
that the government will be especially keen to use its prosecutorial power to still 
the voices of especially disfavored speakers. Yet in Wayte, the Court imposed no 
form of heightened scrutiny to minimize the risk of an impermissible motive.198 
Wayte seems to hold that as long as the government can identify some non-
censorial reasoning for launching an investigation triggered by the target’s speech, 
the First Amendment imposes no restraints on such investigations—regardless of 
their potential for chilling protected expression. Surveillance of a mosque known 
for the radical views of its clergy and congregants, for example, would easily pass 
the Wayte test because the government could claim that its purpose was to identify 
suspected terrorists, not to chill the expression of radical Islamist views.199 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. Id. at 610 (emphasis in original). 
 197. Id. at 612–13. 
 198. Indeed, one advocate of purposivism, Geoffrey Stone, acknowledges that Wayte 
applies an undemanding form of scrutiny to prosecutive decisions. See Stone, supra note 2, 
at 50–51 & nn.18–19. 
 199. For a discussion along these lines of First Amendment objections to the use of 
National Security Letters requiring the production of potentially sensitive or confidential 
information about activities protected by the First Amendment in terrorist investigations, see 
Patrick G. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth 
Amendment Limits on National Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1133–35 (2009). 
Similar reasoning would defeat an effort at erecting a defense under the First Amendment’s 
protection for the free exercise of religion for investigations triggered by or directed at 
religiously motivated activities. Neutral laws of general applicability survive attack under the 
Free Exercise Clause even if they burden religious belief. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 879, 890 (1990). A law lacks neutrality when it disadvantages conduct because it is 
religiously motivated, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 532, 540–41 (1993), and it lacks general applicability when it imposes burdens 
only on conduct motivated by religious belief, id. at 543. One might question whether an 
investigation targeting a specific religious group on the basis of its religiously motivated 
practices or beliefs is a burden of general applicability, but the burden is traceable to a law of 
general applicability, and the Court has characterized investigations undertaken to determine 
if an otherwise generally applicable law has been violated as a burden stemming from a 
generally applicable law. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682–91 (1972). 
Investigations undertaken to identify potential terrorists as part of a general program of 
counterterrorism would accordingly impose the type of neutral and generally applicable 
regulation that does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even though, as the Court 
acknowledged in Smith,  
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
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Purposivists, however, may be able to handle Wayte. They could point out that 
because Wayte involved a defense of selective prosecution, it considered a claim 
that could be made only by those who had violated a concededly valid law. As we 
have seen, purposivists generally acknowledge that laws of general applicability 
usually pose only limited threats to disfavored speech or speakers because the laws’ 
reach is not limited to disfavored speech or speakers.200 Investigations, in contrast, 
such as the surveillance at a radical mosque, can be initiated on the basis of the 
prosecutor’s hostility to disfavored speech or speakers, and because investigations 
can scrutinize the activities of even those whose conduct is lawful, they impose 
special burdens on those who have broken no laws—generally applicable or 
otherwise.201 It is this chilling effect of investigations predicated on the basis of 
constitutionally protected speech that is at the core of the objections to First 
Amendment investigations.202 
The argument for circumscribing First Amendment investigations based on their 
potential chilling effects is a substantial one. First Amendment doctrine exhibits 
considerable concern about the manner in which government regulation may 
produce self-censorship of protected speech when a regulation creates a risk that 
even those engaged in protected expression may be sanctioned.203 For example, 
laws that prohibit a substantial volume of protected speech may be challenged as 
overbroad even by a litigant whose own conduct was unprotected because of the 
chilling effect that such regulations may have on third parties who wish to engage 
in protected expression but may be inhibited by the existence of overbroad laws.204 
The Court has similarly condemned vague laws on the ground that their uncertain 
reach may chill protected expression.205 The Court has also recognized a right to 
engage in anonymous speech to avoid the risk of self-censorship that may occur if 
                                                                                                                 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a 
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh 
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 
494 U.S. at 890. Even Professor Lininger, who is a harsh critic of these investigations, 
concedes that they would likely survive attack under the Free Exercise Clause. See Lininger, 
supra note 166, at 1240–41. 
 200. See supra text accompanying note 10. In that vein, the Court in Wayte took pains to 
note that even vocal nonregistrant protesters could avoid prosecution by registering in 
response to the demand of the government. See 470 U.S. at 609–10. 
 201. For example, in an action brought by a church attacking what it regarded as an 
improper government investigation targeting the church and its membership, the church was 
able to demonstrate that attendance and donations declined as a result of the challenged 
investigation. See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521–22 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, Daniel Solove is surely right that in the main, “[D]emanding 
empirical evidence of deterrence is impractical because it will often be impossible to 
produce.” Solove, supra note 190, at 155. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 189–90. 
 203. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the 
“Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689–725 (1978). 
 204. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–20 (2003); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 255 (2002); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews 
for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1987). 
 205. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872–74 (1997); Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597–604 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963). 
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those who wish to express unpopular views were required to identify themselves.206 
For this same reason it has held that organizations engaged in political or social 
advocacy cannot be compelled to disclose their membership.207 The Court has 
similarly recognized a right of individuals not to be compelled to disclose their 
social or political associations or views,208 and it has also held that individuals 
cannot be compelled to specifically request delivery of mail considered by the 
government to be communist propaganda because of the potential chilling effect of 
such a requirement.209 The Court’s First Amendment anti-retaliation doctrine is in 
the same vein; the Court has held that the government may not retaliate against an 
individual for exercising his First Amendment rights by withholding benefits 
because this too may inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights.210 
These various First Amendment doctrines, however, all involve the imposition 
of some form of penalty on a speaker—the cases involve speakers who face 
sanctions if they engage in some form of protected expression or refuse to disclose 
information about their protected expression, or, at a minimum, face the loss of a 
benefit as the cost of exercising First Amendment rights. Investigations are 
different. If the investigation produces evidence that a speaker has violated an 
otherwise valid law, then the speaker will be prosecuted for unprotected conduct. 
Even if his or her speech triggered the investigation, Wayte makes plain that the 
First Amendment offers no defense. If the speaker violated no law, however, the 
investigation will result in no sanctions. To be sure, there is a risk that an 
investigation will wrongly produce an enforcement action against a speaker whose 
activities are protected, but if the substantive law being enforced is neither 
impermissibly overbroad, vague, nor otherwise invalid, then the risk of error in 
such a prosecution is not itself a basis for constitutional complaint. The risk of error 
that inheres in all litigation is not itself sufficient to support a First Amendment 
claim.211 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 
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(1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995); Talley v. 
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rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958). 
 208. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 485–90 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250–55 (1957). 
 209. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965). 
 210. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588–89 & n.10 (1998); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1972). 
 211. The Court has made this point, for example, in the context of obscenity statutes: 
It may be true that the stiffer RICO penalties will provide an additional 
deterrent to those who might otherwise sell obscene materials; perhaps this 
means—as petitioner suggests—that some cautious booksellers will practice 
self-censorship and remove First Amendment protected materials from their 
shelves. But deterrence of the sale of obscene materials is a legitimate end of 
state antiobscenity laws, and our cases have long recognized the practical 
reality that “any form of criminal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller 
will induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect 
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It is far from clear that an investigation unaccompanied by compulsion exerted 
on the target or any other type of sanction or penalty constitutes an “abridgement” 
of the freedom of speech, or of the press. During the investigation, the speaker 
remains free to communicate with others even as the investigators attempt to learn 
more about the speaker’s activities. The existence of the investigation may cause 
the target to engage in some form of self-censorship, but not because the 
government has exercised any coercive power other than the power to investigate. 
When an investigative target remains free to speak, and faces no sanction—not 
even the need to shoulder the costs of defending an enforcement action—it is far 
from clear that the First Amendment is offended. 
Indeed, the distinction between regulations that attach sanctions to protected 
speech and mere investigations was central to the only case in which the Court 
considered First Amendment investigations. In Laird v. Tatum,212 the plaintiffs 
challenged under the First Amendment “the Army’s alleged ‘surveillance of lawful 
and peaceful civilian political activity.’”213 While acknowledging that it “ha[d] 
found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the 
deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct 
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights,” the Court added, “in 
each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, 
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or 
prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was 
challenging.”214 The Court accordingly framed the question before it as  
whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a 
complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment 
rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a 
governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to 
be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the 
accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose.215  
The Court held that the claim was nonjusticiable because it rested on no more than 
the plaintiffs’ “perception of the system as inappropriate” or their “speculative 
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in 
some way that would cause direct harm to [plaintiffs].”216 
The precise holding of Laird is narrow—the Court considered the alleged 
chilling effect of a program of intelligence gathering “without more.”217 The lower 
courts have accordingly read Laird to render nonjusticiable First Amendment 
attacks on an investigation when the plaintiff cannot prove that it was a target of an 
                                                                                                                 
on the dissemination of material not obscene.” The mere assertion of some 
possible self-censorship resulting from a statute is not enough to render an 
antiobscenity law unconstitutional under our precedents. 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154–55 (1959)). 
 212. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 213. Id. at 2. 
 214. Id. at 11. 
 215. Id. at 10. 
 216. Id. at 13. 
 217. Id. at 10. 
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investigation,218 but plaintiffs who can establish that they have actually been 
targeted for investigation are usually thought to have presented justiciable claims, 
at least when they also establish objective evidence of a chilling effect associated 
with the complained-of investigation or some other tangible consequence for the 
protected activities of the investigative target.219 Nevertheless, Laird’s distinction 
between coercive regulation, proscription, or compulsion and mere investigation 
seems to hold no less significance for substantive First Amendment doctrine than 
justiciability. 
Consider the First Amendment right to anonymous speech. It is settled that the 
First Amendment affords a right to distribute leaflets and other literature 
anonymously.220 It is equally settled that leafleting cannot be prohibited as a means 
of preventing littering.221 But neither of these doctrines goes so far as to prevent a 
police officer who observes anonymously distributed leaflets scattered on the 
sidewalk from interviewing witnesses who may have seen the littering take place in 
order to learn the identity of the littering leafleter who prefers anonymity.222 As we 
have seen, the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel an 
individual to surrender anonymity; but if the government is able to determine the 
individual’s identity by obtaining the cooperation of the investigation’s target or 
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2011] FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS 47 
 
others, there is no First Amendment doctrine that declares such an investigation 
illegitimate. Albeit in the context of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court has been quite clear on this point: 
“[W]hen an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk 
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities.”223 Thus, if 
witnesses, or the leafleter himself, discloses to the investigator the identity of the 
littering leafleter, it is hard to understand how the First Amendment is offended. 
Under Wayte, an ensuing prosecution for littering would seem to be constitutionally 
unremarkable. 
To be sure, the government’s ability to compromise anonymity through an 
investigation may well have a chilling effect on speech, but the doctrine addressing 
claims of a “chill” associated with an investigation undertaken for an ostensibly 
proper law-enforcement purpose takes an intensely pragmatic approach quite 
inconsistent with the purposivists’ focus on the risk of an illicit governmental 
motive. Even in contexts rife with a risk of improper motive, when the government 
is merely gathering information rather than imposing sanctions, the Court has 
carefully balanced the magnitude of the burden on speech against the governmental 
interests at stake, without evident concern about the risk of improper governmental 
motive, much less the use of strict scrutiny. 
For example, in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities 
Control Board,224 the Court considered an administrative order requiring the 
Communist Party to register as a subversive organization and disclose its 
membership and officers.225 The Court rejected an argument that the First 
Amendment shielded the party unless the board found that it specifically intended 
to overthrow the government, noting that the Subversive Activities Control Act “is 
a regulatory, not a prohibitory statute.”226 Despite the cases recognizing a First 
Amendment right to engage in anonymous speech, the Court upheld the disclosure 
requirement in light of “the magnitude of the public interests which the registration 
and disclosure provisions are designed to protect and in the pertinence which 
registration and disclosure bear to the protection of those interests.”227 Thus, 
despite the risk of a governmental motive to harm a particularly disfavored speaker, 
the Court engaged in classic balancing—stressing that the law imposed no 
prohibition on protected expression and that it advanced particularly important 
governmental interests.  
Similarly, in Barenblatt v. United States,228 the Court rejected a witness’s 
assertion of a First Amendment right to resist disclosing information about his 
membership in the Communist Party in a legislative investigation, explaining that 
cases involving prohibitions on protected associational activity were inapposite 
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because the case involved an investigation and not a prosecution.229 The Court 
upheld the investigative demand by applying a balancing test.230 
One might think the cases upholding investigations of persons or organizations 
thought to be subversive mere relics of the darkest days of the Cold War, but the 
same approach was taken decades later in Meese v. Keene.231 The Court upheld a 
provision in the Foreign Agents Registration Act that required those who distribute 
foreign films identified by the State Department as “political propaganda” to 
register and disclose their business activities, their political activities, and the extent 
of the film’s distribution.232 The decision was based on three considerations: first, 
the requirements “d[id] nothing to place regulated expressive materials ‘beyond the 
pale of legitimate discourse,’” but instead “simply required the disseminators of 
such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to 
evaluate the import of the propaganda”;233 second, “the term ‘political propaganda’ 
. . . is a broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one”;234 and third, Congress’s 
use of that term “does not lead us to suspend the respect we normally owe to the 
Legislature’s power to define the terms that it uses in legislation.”235 The Court 
reached this conclusion even though the term “political propaganda” was defined as 
advocacy of the views of a foreign country or political faction, or advocacy that 
promotes some form of instability or violence.236 Thus, the Court considered what 
it regarded as a modest chilling effect imposed by the registration and disclosure 
requirements to be adequately justified—another instance of pragmatic balancing. 
Accordingly, in a context rife with a risk of discrimination against disfavored 
speakers or views—the kind of case in which the purposivists argue that strict 
scrutiny is required—the Court utilized nothing like the strict scrutiny test, and 
concluded that the limited burden imposed by the legislation was adequately 
justified.237 
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 237. Keene is not the only example in which the Court has engaged in deferential review 
of compelled disclosure of confidential information after concluding that the inhibitory 
effect of the compelled disclosure was not likely to be great. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 
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Yet, the balance in these cases does not always favor the government. In cases 
involving legislative investigations in which there was less reason to believe that 
the disclosures demanded were likely to produce evidence of subversive or other 
unlawful activities, for example, the Court struck the balance in favor of a First 
Amendment right to resist disclosure.238 In none of these cases did the subject of 
the investigation face any type of penalty or sanction (beyond the sanctions 
available if they failed to cooperate with the investigation); the chilling effect of the 
investigation itself was regarded as sufficient to invoke the protections of the First 
Amendment. 
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,239 similarly, the Court invalidated a statute 
empowering a state obscenity commission to notify distributors of material that it 
had found objectionable and potentially subject to prosecution under state 
obscenity laws on the ground that the statute created an unacceptable risk that 
distributors would engage in self-censorship with respect to material that had not 
been adjudicated to be obscene.240 Bantam Books involved a far greater inhibitory 
threat than Meese v. Keene—the targeted films were put at a serious competitive 
disadvantage by the threat of criminal prosecution with little evident justification, 
since the state was free to bring obscenity prosecutions against the film distributors 
if it were serious about the films’ illegality.  
Thus, in cases in which the government imposes no prohibition or direct cost on 
the exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court will consider claims of “chilling 
effect,” but only by balancing the degree of the inhibition against the governmental 
interests at stake—not by considering the risk of impermissible motivation, as the 
purposivists would have it. The difference between Bantam Books and Meese v. 
Keene or the Cold War cases does not seem to be based on the increased risk of a 
governmental motive to burden disfavored speakers, but instead on the potency of 
the inhibitory effect of the challenged law, coupled with the lack of a sufficient 
justification to warrant such a potentially powerful tool for chilling the exercise of 
First Amendment rights. 
The Court’s campaign finance disclosure cases reflect the same pattern. Despite 
the First Amendment interests in anonymity, the Court has upheld disclosure 
requirements for contributors to political campaigns in light of the government’s 
interests in promoting political accountability by candidates, deterring corruption, 
and assisting law enforcement.241 Yet, the Court has invalidated disclosure 
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requirements as applied to a minor party on the ground that the governmental 
interests at stake were less compelling and the risk of harassment or intimidation of 
minor-party contributors much greater.242 
Thus, the aforementioned cases involving the potential “chilling effect” of 
government actions that fall short of prohibiting or penalizing protected speech 
concern themselves with balancing the extent of the inhibition and its justification, 
not the government’s motivation. Purposivism has no evident place here, and with 
good reason. A jurisprudence that concerns itself primarily with the government’s 
motive, thereby equating a mere investigation of a politically unpopular group with 
an outright prohibition on its existence, seems an awfully poor approach for 
identifying “abridgements” of the freedom of speech. After all, a discrete and 
limited investigation, even if undertaken for entirely improper reasons, poses little 
risk of suppressing anything; indeed, its targets may be entirely unaware that the 
investigation has taken place. A focus on motive seems quite out of place in this 
context. 
But perhaps the purposivists can handle even this objection. After all, the 
purposivists argue that the threat of improper motivation justifies only heightened 
scrutiny, not automatic acceptance of a First Amendment claim. Purposivists could 
argue that the balancing in this line of cases reflects precisely the kind of strict 
scrutiny that they advocate—even if the cases themselves do not use the lingo of 
strict scrutiny. Yet, it is unclear that this is a fair characterization of the cases. As 
we have seen, in cases arising in contexts with the kind of high risk of improper 
motivation in which the purposivists claim that strict scrutiny is required, the Court 
upheld regulations without much evidence of heightened scrutiny. In the 
Subversive Activities Control Act case, for example, the Court expressly deferred 
to congressional judgment,243 as it did again in Meese v. Keene.244 Thus, less severe 
restrictions on communicative liberty seem to draw less intensive scrutiny, 
regardless of the risk of improper governmental motive.  
In any event, even if the balancing in chilling effect cases can be reconciled with 
the purposivist account, there are other objections to be considered—in particular, a 
pragmatic claim that strict scrutiny of First Amendment investigations is inherently 
unworkable and that such a standard compromises critical law-enforcement 
interests. 
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C. The Pragmatic Case for Balancing 
The difficulties in applying heightened scrutiny to investigative activities are 
reflected in the proposals of those who advocate First Amendment restrictions on 
such investigations. These commentators argue that some evidentiary threshold and 
procedural protections—such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a 
crime is underway and the use of the least restrictive means to investigate—should 
be required for investigations based on or directed at collecting information about 
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment.245 In fact, powerful 
pragmatic considerations underlie the balancing test that we have seen provides a 
doctrinal basis for undertaking a constitutional assessment of First Amendment 
investigations, while simultaneously counseling against the commentators’ 
proposals for more exacting forms of judicial review.  
The probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion standards fit the investigative 
context poorly, if at all. Reasonable suspicion is the standard required by the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure when an investigator 
“seizes” an individual by depriving him of the freedom of movement.246 Probable 
cause is the standard required to take an individual into custody for anything more 
than a brief period of investigative detention.247 When there is no search or seizure, 
however, the Fourth Amendment does not limit investigative activities even when 
an investigation has focused on a particular suspect.248 It is therefore far from clear 
that these probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion standards—crafted to be sensitive 
to the balance between liberty and order when the government effectively takes an 
individual into physical custody—have any place when investigators impose no 
direct restraint on liberty. 
The practical objection to a probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion requirement 
for an investigation involving no “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment should be plain: if the government is prohibited from initiating 
an investigation of an extremist group on the basis of its speech, its ability to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 190, at 661–73 (requiring reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity and use of the least restrictive means to investigate on the basis of protected 
activities); Lininger, supra note 166, at 1269–71 (requiring particularized suspicion of 
criminal activity); Lynch, supra note 190, at 299–300 (requiring probable cause to believe 
target has violated or is violating the law and the use of least restrictive means for 
investigation of protected activities in nonpublic settings); Solove, supra note 190, at 154–63 
(requiring investigations that gather a substantial amount of information about protected 
activities to be narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest, ordinarily 
requiring a warrant and probable cause); Strandburg, supra note 190, at 804–11 (requiring 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to investigate groups on the basis of protected 
activities and probable cause to investigate individuals); Eric Lardiere, Comment, The 
Justiciability and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
976, 1018–34 (1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion and least restrictive means). 
 246. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185–89 (2004); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498–99 (1983); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 880–82 (1975). 
 247. See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629–30 (2003) (per curiam); Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–16 (1979). 
 248. See supra note 187. 
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develop the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary to support 
more intrusive investigative techniques—such as search or seizure—will be greatly 
circumscribed. A mosque known for its advocacy of extreme forms of Islam may 
be a breeding ground for terrorists, but if investigators cannot conduct interviews or 
commence a surveillance to determine if known terrorists are gathering there, there 
is little chance that probable cause or reasonable suspicion will ever emerge—until 
it is too late. 
After all, incipient terrorist organizations rarely advertise their intentions. If the 
authorities are forbidden to commence an investigation until they somehow 
stumble onto evidence amounting to probable cause or reasonable suspicion—the 
type of evidence that might pass muster under some form of heightened scrutiny—
then investigations that uncover extremists groups as they cross the line from 
advocacy into criminality will be few and far between.249 Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence recognizes this point by limiting the probable-cause and reasonable-
suspicion requirements to investigations sufficiently intrusive to be considered 
“searches” or “seizures.” It is quite unclear that First Amendment jurisprudence 
should take a different approach. 
A least-restrictive-means requirement is equally problematic. In Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, a least-restrictive-means requirement for investigations 
has been emphatically rejected on eminently pragmatic grounds: “[T]he logic of 
such elaborate less-restrictive alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers 
to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.”250 Again, it is unclear 
that this observation has any less potency in the First Amendment context. 
These very considerations were at the root of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Branzburg v. Hayes.251 In that case, reporters argued that—because of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 249. Judge Posner wrote, in ruling to modify a decree that required the Chicago Police 
Department to refrain from investigations of activities protected by the First Amendment 
absent reasonable suspicion: 
New groups of political extremists, believers in and advocates of violence, form 
daily around the world. If one forms in or migrates to Chicago, the decree 
renders the police helpless to do anything to protect the public against the day 
when the group decides to commit a terrorist act. Until the group goes beyond 
the advocacy of violence and begins preparatory actions that might create 
reasonable suspicion of imminent criminal activity, the hands of the police are 
tied. And if the police have been forbidden to investigate until then, if the 
investigation cannot begin until the group is well on its way toward the 
commission of terrorist acts, the investigation may come too late to prevent the 
acts or to identify the perpetrators. If police get wind that a group of people 
have begun meeting and discussing the desirability of committing acts of 
violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda, a due regard for the public safety 
counsels allowing the police department to monitor the statements of the 
group’s members, to build a file, perhaps to plant an undercover agent. 
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 250. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (quoting 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976)); accord, e.g., Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350–51 (2001); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 
(1983). 
 251. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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inhibitory effect that compelled disclosure would have on newsgathering—the First 
Amendment does not permit a grand jury to use its subpoena power to compel them 
to disclose confidential sources unless: 
sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the reporter possesses 
information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the 
information the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that 
need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the 
claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by its 
disclosure.252  
Rejecting this claim, the Court stressed that the obligation to testify before a grand 
jury involved no prohibition or penalty on what the press may publish;253 that the 
extent to which this obligation would inhibit journalists was highly speculative;254 
and that historically “the press has operated without constitutional protection for 
press informants, and the press has flourished.”255 The Court concluded that even 
assuming that  
an undetermined number of informants . . . will . . . refuse to talk to 
newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter in an official 
investigation, we cannot accept the argument that the public interest in 
possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources 
must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and 
prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus 
deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.256 
Surveying the governmental interests supporting an expansive investigative 
power, the Court observed that because the grand jury’s “task is to inquire into the 
existence of possible criminal conduct . . . its investigative powers are necessarily 
broad.”257 Requiring a preliminary showing of necessity to hale a journalist before 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. Id. at 680. 
 253. As the Court explained: 
 We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the 
country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for 
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated. But these cases involve no intrusions 
upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may 
publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it 
prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no 
penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue 
here. The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted; 
reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law. 
No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or 
indiscriminately to disclose them on request. 
Id. at 681–82. 
 254. See id. at 693–95. 
 255. Id. at 698–99. 
 256. Id. at 695. 
 257. Id. at 688. Thus, “[t]he investigative power of the grand jury is necessarily broad if 
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a grand jury, the Court concluded, was inconsistent with the grand jury’s interest in 
examining all relevant evidence.258 Moreover, “a constitutional newsman’s 
privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.”259 
The Court would be pressed to afford such a privilege to anyone claiming to be 
gathering information in order to engage in protected expression,260 and a 
requirement that a subpoena advanced a compelling governmental interest would 
enmesh the courts in difficult decisions of law-enforcement policy beyond their 
expertise.261 The Court added that “there is much force in the pragmatic view that 
the press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far from 
helpless to protect itself from harassment or substantial harm.”262 In any event,  
news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and 
grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good 
faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First 
Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for 
purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s relationship 
with his news sources would have no justification.263 
Thus, in a context in which the inhibitory effect of an investigation on protected 
expression was surely no less than the chilling effect of an investigation based on 
or directed at protected activities, the Court engaged in pragmatic balancing, while 
resisting strict scrutiny because of the many difficulties in determining what type of 
investigative activities can survive such scrutiny. Although Branzburg 
acknowledges a limit to the investigative power, this limit requires only a good-
faith law investigative justification for a subpoena, or, under the standard proposed 
by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, some legitimate law-enforcement 
justification for the subpoena.264 This is a standard remarkably like that employed 
                                                                                                                 
its public responsibility is to be adequately discharged.” Id. at 700 (citing Costello v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)). 
 258. As the Court explained: 
The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law 
enforcement necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to 
determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it. To 
this end it must call witnesses, in the manner best suited to perform its task. 
“When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general 
problem area . . . society’s interest is best served by a thorough and extensive 
investigation.” A grand jury investigation “is not fully carried out until every 
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper 
way to find if a crime has been committed.” Such an investigation may be 
triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal 
knowledge of the grand jurors. It is only after the grand jury has examined the 
evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an 
indictment can be made. 
Id. at 701–02 (citations omitted). 
 259. Id. at 703–04. 
 260. Id. at 704–05. 
 261. Id. at 705–06. 
 262. Id. at 706. 
 263. Id. at 707–08 (footnote omitted). 
 264. Although Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court which, as we have seen, 
2011] FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS 55 
 
by the courts that have rejected any form of heightened scrutiny for First 
                                                                                                                 
required only a good-faith investigative purpose while rejecting any form of heightened 
scrutiny or evidentiary showing to support a subpoena to a reporter, his separate opinion 
articulates the standard for resisting a subpoena somewhat differently: 
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted 
in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to 
give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject 
of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony 
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law 
enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an 
appropriate protective order may be entered.  
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). The only advocate of First Amendment limitations on the 
investigative power to consider Branzburg is Professor Solove, who stresses Justice Powell’s 
separate opinion, which provided the fifth vote for the majority’s disposition of the case, as 
supporting the view that the First Amendment limits investigative authority. See Solove, 
supra note 190, at 150–51. Yet, Justice Powell did not require probable cause or any form of 
heightened scrutiny, and he placed the burden on the reporter to establish that a subpoena 
was unsupported by any legitimate law-enforcement purpose. This standard differs little if at 
all from the standard governing the enforceability of all grand jury subpoenas, which was 
developed in an opinion that cited Branzburg in support of the standard it adopted. See 
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299–302 (1991). The courts of appeals 
have consistently read Branzburg to reject any type of First Amendment defense to a grand 
jury subpoena supported by some legitimate law-enforcement purpose. See, e.g., N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 172–74 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 
44–46 (1st Cir. 2004); Scarce v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 5 F.3d 397, 
399–402 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850, 852–53 (4th Cir. 
1992); Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 583–
86 (6th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has consistently cited Branzburg for the proposition 
that the press is obligated to comply with generally applicable legal obligations despite the 
burden that compliance places on newsgathering. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 
U.S. 663, 669–71 (1991); Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 493 
U.S. 182, 201 (1990); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986); Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–35 (1974). To be sure, some lower courts have recognized a 
qualified reporter’s privilege, albeit without specifically holding that the privilege is 
constitutionally compelled rather than simply a balancing process typically undertaken when 
assessing claims of common law privilege. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 
1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76–77 (2d Cir. 1983); 
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710–15 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 
F.2d 139, 147–48 (3d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725–27 
(5th Cir. 1980). The question of whether the public interest in facilitating vigorous reporting 
justifies a common law privilege is not of constitutional dimension and accordingly presents 
different considerations from the First Amendment issue addressed in Branzburg. See, e.g., 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d at 1166–72 (Tatel, J., concurring); 
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2003). In any event, only four circuits 
have recognized even a qualified reporter’s privilege in criminal cases, and that privilege 
rarely results in protection for reporters. See James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, 
Enacting a Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 
AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1308–10 (2008); see also 3 SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 3.26, 3.26.50 
(surveying decisions in the lower courts). 
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Amendment investigations.265 More important for present purposes, this approach 
is wholly inconsistent with the purposivist account.  
As we have seen, purposivists believe that strict scrutiny is warranted when 
enforcement officials exercise largely unchecked discretion because of the risk that 
they act on the basis of impermissible motives, coupled with the difficulties in 
requiring litigants to adduce proof of illicit motive.266 These risks are fully present 
when prosecutors and grand juries exercise their discretion to subpoena reporters to 
testify before a grand jury. In Branzburg, for example, two of the consolidated 
cases involved stories suggesting that the incumbent prosecutor had failed to 
effectively control drug dealing in the area,267 and two others involved reporters 
who had covered African American militants.268 Prosecutors might readily be 
expected to subpoena reporters who are exposing government inefficiency or 
offering potentially sympathetic coverage to dissidents than for reporters engaged 
in more mainstream fare.  
More generally, there surely is a natural temptation to believe that one’s political 
opponents—especially those of the most extreme hues—are up to no good, and a 
concurrent temptation to use investigative resources in an effort to develop 
substance to one’s suspicions. Those who would indulge these temptations are 
equally likely to be less than fully sensitive to the impact of such investigations on 
the ability of dissident groups to attract and retain support in the face of such 
scrutiny. From the point of view of the authorities in power, that kind of chilling 
effect may count as what an economist might call a second-order benefit of the 
investigation, not one of its costs. It is considerations of this character that are at the 
heart of the purposivist case for strict scrutiny; as we have seen, purposivists regard 
strict scrutiny as justified in order to relieve litigants of what is thought to be the 
unrealistic burden of adducing proof of actual motive.269 Yet, under Branzburg, the 
risk of improper motive when the government elects to require reporters to disclose 
their sources produces nothing like strict scrutiny. 
Indeed, one might argue that there is no justification for any First Amendment 
limitations on investigation. Given that investigative agencies operate in a world of 
limited resources, one might believe that there is little reason to believe that the 
authorities will undertake investigations without adequate justification. Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, however, rejects such a presumption of governmental 
efficiency and instead requires at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
undertake a seizure, as we have seen.270 The rather extensive history of abusive 
investigations targeting political dissidents also cuts against the view that the 
government is unlikely to overreach in the exercise of its investigative powers.271 
And, as we have seen, there is ample reason to believe that investigative tactics will 
be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the hostility of elected officials to 
reporting inconsistent with their own political interests.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 188. 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
 267. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–70. 
 268. Id. at 672–78. 
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 7–9. 
 270. See supra text accompanying note 246. 
 271. See supra text accompanying notes 172–86. 
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Yet, the pragmatic arguments against intrusive judicial oversight are 
overwhelming—if the government can undertake only those investigations it can 
demonstrate are likely to bear fruit, few if any investigations will begin until after a 
crime has already claimed its victims. It is surely rational for the government to 
undertake an investigation of speech that appears to condone violence, or of groups 
who have a track record of violence, not only to discover incipient plots, but to 
learn something of the structure and membership of potentially violent groups. That 
knowledge provides a useful source of investigative leads should a crime 
subsequently occur that could reasonably be attributed to a member of the group.  
For example, some knowledge of the structure and membership of extreme anti-
abortion groups would provide a useful source of investigative leads should a 
prominent abortionist subsequently be murdered; and law-enforcement officials 
might rationally decide to obtain those leads before anyone is murdered, rather than 
delay their investigation by developing these leads only after someone has died. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the argument for intelligence gathering is particularly 
powerful for politically motivated crimes less likely to be deterred by after-the-fact 
punishment, such as 9/11-style terrorism.272 But although these forms of 
intelligence gathering might be rational, on the purposivist account, something 
more than mere rationality should be required when the government is able to 
impose special disabilities on disfavored speech or speakers. Nevertheless, the 
pragmatic objections to that view have carried the day in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. From Wayte to Branzburg, the Court has consistently held that any 
plausible law-enforcement justification for an investigation triggered by protected 
speech will be sufficient to stave off a challenge, despite the risk that dissenters will 
experience potent chilling effects on their First Amendment rights. 
D. The Pragmatic Approach to First Amendment Investigations 
Thus, First Amendment doctrine provides little support for the view that an 
investigation directed at or initiated by protected expression must satisfy some form 
of heightened scrutiny. Neither does it suggest that the First Amendment is silent 
about such investigations. The degree of intrusion on First Amendment interests as 
well as the justification for the investigation must be considered.  
A discrete investigation of which the target may be entirely unaware has little 
potential to chill protected speech beyond the type of general chilling effect created 
by the mere knowledge that the government engaged in such investigations—a chill 
considered nonjusticiable in Laird. Even if the subject learns of the investigation, it 
is far from clear that this knowledge will be sufficient to deter the subject from 
engaging in protected activities.273 Indeed, in Branzburg, the Court was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 158–68. 
 273. For example, a survey of Muslim Americans after the attacks of September 11 
concluded that although more than 70% of those surveyed believed that the government 
monitored their use of the Internet, 86.8% of respondents indicated that they had not changed 
their Internet behavior after September 11. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of 
Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. 
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375, 390–91 (2007).  
58 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1 
 
understandably reluctant to engage in this type of speculation.274 Moreover, if the 
investigation has a plausible law-enforcement justification, a court will not attempt 
to assess its investigative merits because it is so difficult to know what an 
investigation will bring to light unless it is conducted. It is equally impracticable 
for courts to tolerate the delay that would inhere in permitting the parties to litigate 
every investigative proposal before it is executed, even putting aside the problems 
with alerting the target to the investigation in order to permit litigation of its 
propriety. Indulging what could be endless judicial second-guessing after the fact 
about whether some less restrictive investigative option could have been pursued 
seems no more attractive. Even a more modest probable-cause or reasonable 
suspicion requirement could be enormously problematic—it is unclear how the 
authorities will ever acquire probable cause or reasonable suspicion if 
investigations cannot be initiated on a lesser standard. Yet, absolute deference to 
investigative decision making is little more attractive; the kind of vindictive poison 
pen letters that cost people jobs and marriages as a consequence of the FBI’s most 
egregious excesses should make for a strong case under the First Amendment. 
These tactics differ little from the kind of penalty for the assertion of First 
Amendment rights that the Supreme Court has condemned. 
The First Amendment investigation provides a particularly good test for the 
purposivist account of the First Amendment because it disaggregates the threat of 
an improper governmental motive from the justification and repressive effects of 
challenged governmental activity. Investigations undertaken as a consequence of 
protected activity or directed at learning about protected activity involve all the 
risks of impermissible motive that the purposivists claim justify heightened 
scrutiny. Investigators have largely unfettered discretion in deciding whether and 
how to undertake an investigation and will likely be quicker to target political 
opponents than supporters for investigation. Yet, the only hint of heightened 
scrutiny in the case law occurs when there is an especially severe inhibitory effect 
lacking an evident justification, as in the minor-party campaign contribution 
disclosure or the state obscenity commission cases.275 The risk of impermissible 
motive, without more, produces no trace of heightened scrutiny, and the “chilling 
effect” cases, as we have seen, utilize straightforward balancing of the individual 
and governmental interests at stake. Even when there is some significant risk of 
chilling effect—as the Court acknowledged in Branzburg—the justification for 
wide investigative powers will trump the uncertain chilling effect of an 
investigation that involves no actual prohibition or penalty on protected expression. 
The “chilling effect” cases in general, and the First Amendment investigation cases 
in particular, demonstrate that the risk of impermissible motivation does not 
displace pragmatic balancing in First Amendment adjudication.276 
                                                                                                                 
 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 251–53. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 237–38, 240. 
 276. One might argue that given the importance of expansive investigative powers, 
Branzburg should be understood as a strict scrutiny case in which the government had a 
compelling interest in pursuing investigations largely free of judicial scrutiny. For example, 
Charles Fried has argued that in assessing the government’s interest in pursuing an 
investigation, it is proper to assess the totality of the governmental interest in pursuing wide-
ranging investigations rather than confining the inquiry to the particular investigation at 
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Indeed, the First Amendment investigation provides a potent challenge not only 
to the purposivists, but also to any absolutist or categorical account of the First 
Amendment’s protections. Although there are many different versions of First 
Amendment absolutism or categoricalism, the common feature of these accounts is 
that they reject balancing and insist that the First Amendment provides absolute 
protection for activities that are communicative in character.277 Yet, when it comes 
to First Amendment investigations, balancing is inevitable; absolutists have no very 
good way to handle First Amendment investigations. An absolutist could prohibit 
all First Amendment investigations on the theory that communication that involves 
no effort at coercion or other types of interference with the rights of others is 
entitled to absolute protection, but a prohibition on investigation triggered by 
protected speech would disable the government from learning whether those 
engaged in protected speech that nevertheless suggests some potential for 
noncommunicative and hence unprotected evils—such as speech endorsing 
violence—are in fact working to bring just those evils about. Since it is quite settled 
that the First Amendment does not grant a right to use words as a means to 
organize for violence or otherwise to undertake unlawful conduct,278 it is hard to 
understand why absolutism could demand that the government refrain from 
investigating to determine if an unprotected conspiracy is underway.  
Justice Douglas’s approach in Branzburg reflects the difficulties with First 
Amendment absolutism. In that case, he took the absolutist position that a reporter 
can never be compelled to appear before a grand jury except as a target of an 
investigation.279 This would mean that a reporter could not be compelled to repeat 
as a witness before a grand jury the same matters contained in an already published 
account for which the reporter provided no assurances of confidentiality. Surely it 
is difficult to see how in such circumstances the reporter’s testimony inhibits 
                                                                                                                 
issue. See Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme 
Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 765–70 (1963). Accordingly, one could 
argue that affording the grand jury wide-ranging investigative power is also the least 
restrictive alternative for achieving this compelling interest. Nevertheless, this approach is 
inconsistent with Branzburg itself, which rejects strict scrutiny. Moreover, it amounts to a 
claim that the government has a compelling interest in freeing itself from intrusive review 
under strict scrutiny, which surely puts the cart before the horse. Yet, even this 
understanding of Branzburg ultimately acknowledges the centrality of pragmatic balancing 
and rejects the purposivist claim that the risk of improper motivation requires heightened 
judicial review. 
 277. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 138–91 
(1989); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16–20 (1970); 
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 269–83, 296–301; David L. Faigman, Reconciling 
Individual Rights and Governmental Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme 
Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1555–62 (1992); Fee, supra note 17, at 1157–69; 
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255–
63; Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 106–33 (1989). For what is perhaps 
the classic statement of First Amendment absolutism, see Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 
35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874–76 (1960). 
 278. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008). 
 279. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712–14 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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freedom of the press to any greater extent that any other generally applicable 
burden imposed on reporters or the press, such as the obligation to pay generally 
applicable taxes, to which the First Amendment interposes no objection.280 Any 
other approach to a reporter’s obligation to testify, however, requires a pragmatic 
balance between the chilling effect on newsgathering of the obligation to testify and 
the needs of law enforcement, even one that recognizes a qualified reporter’s 
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of sources.281 
Conversely, an absolutist could permit First Amendment investigations by 
denying that investigations have any sufficiently inhibitory effect to implicate the 
First Amendment. This approach, however, would permit the most odious abuses in 
this area, such as the poison pen letters directed to the employers or spouses of 
dissidents, which are likely as potent a means as any of suppressing dissent.282 An 
absolutism that permits all First Amendment investigations is little more attractive 
than an absolutism that forbids them all. 
A due respect for the constitutional protection for expression seems to require 
some effort to gauge the inhibitory effects of an investigation, but without wearing 
blinders to the need for responsible investigative techniques. Even for the 
absolutist, the First Amendment investigation seems inevitably to lead to pragmatic 
balancing.  
III. THE FREE TRADE IN IDEAS AS THE BALANCING METRIC IN  
FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
One should not be too quick to reject the purposivist account in its entirety. 
After all, with its many carefully calibrated standards of scrutiny, First Amendment 
doctrine is far more complex than a process of ad hoc weighing of costs and 
benefits.283 What is more, the purposivists’ attack on balancing has considerable 
force. As we have seen, purposivists deny that there is any principled basis for 
courts to “balance” free expression against countervailing government interests.284 
In this, they are part of a long tradition of First Amendment scholarship that decries 
balancing as an invitation to undisciplined judicial subjectivity.285 As one of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 280. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444–50 (1991); Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983). 
 281. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 739–43 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 282. See supra text accompanying note 175. 
 283. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 284. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 285. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 277, at 125–37; EMERSON, supra note 277, at 16, 167–
68, 717–18; LANGE & POWELL, supra note 80, at 266–69; Laurent B. Frantz, The First 
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1432–50 (1962); Steven J. Heyman, Righting 
the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. 
L. REV. 1275, 1305–12 (1998); Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation 
Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4, 7–14 (1961); R. George Wright, 
Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 103, 133–38 (2004). For perhaps the 
canonical attack on balancing in constitutional law, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972–1004 (1987). 
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leading scholars in this tradition has argued: “To resolve First Amendment 
questions, one cannot avoid making ideological judgments.”286 
In the face of these attacks, balancing looks less than satisfying—descriptively 
and normatively—as an account of First Amendment doctrine. Yet, balancing can 
offer an account of First Amendment doctrine that not only explains the structure of 
First Amendment doctrine, but is sensitive as well to the need for doctrinal rigor. 
While entirely ad hoc balancing is likely to prove unacceptably indeterminate, First 
Amendment doctrine has developed an approach for evaluating the pertinent 
interests that makes balancing structured and rigorous by looking at free speech 
much the way that economists look at markets. 
Long before the birth of the law and economics movement, Justice Holmes 
characterized the First Amendment as protecting the “free trade in ideas.”287 The 
metaphor of the First Amendment preserving robust competition in a “marketplace 
of ideas” has since become a commonplace in First Amendment jurisprudence.288 A 
correlative principle has been embraced as well: the Court tells us that the First 
Amendment protects the right to receive information no less than the right to 
communicate it.289  
Thus, the First Amendment values more than the speaker’s individual interest in 
communicating; the interests of listeners and the integrity of competition in the 
metaphorical marketplace of ideas are critical as well. If one thinks about free 
speech as a competitive market in which systemic interests are as important as the 
interests of individual speakers, then it becomes possible to develop a metric for 
assessing the impact of a challenged regulation on free speech interests.290 Using 
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this metric, First Amendment jurisprudence balances the interest in an unfettered 
marketplace of ideas against the regulatory interests of the government in a 
reasonably predictable and structured fashion. Regulatory burdens imposed on all 
market participants may reduce the quantity of speech just as a generally applicable 
tax will reduce demand and hence output, but they are unlikely to have dramatic 
effects on competition within the marketplace of ideas. For that reason, they are 
generally upheld. Regulatory burdens with the potential to fall unequally on 
competitors, in contrast, can skew the market, and therefore pose a qualitatively 
different kind of problem for free trade in ideas.291 Thus, the hospitality of First 
Amendment jurisprudence to generally applicable laws—as well as the suspicion 
directed at content or viewpoint-specific regulation—can be explained without 
need of the purposivist account. 
A. Content-Neutral Regulation and the Free Trade in Ideas 
Consider at one end of the spectrum the kind of case in which the Court sees no 
First Amendment problem with a challenged regulation.  
Generally applicable laws that prohibit conduct with no expressive significance 
are thought to raise no First Amendment problem, even if they impose costs on 
those engaged in protected speech. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,292 for example, 
the Court held that an injunction requiring the closure of a bookstore as a public 
nuisance based on repeated incidents of prostitution and other unlawful sexual 
activities on the premises required no First Amendment scrutiny because the 
“sexual activity carried on in this case manifests absolutely no element of protected 
expression.”293 The Court reasoned that when a regulation is not directed at 
expression, the First Amendment comes into play only when it is applied to 
“conduct with a significant expressive element . . . or where a statute based on a 
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2011] FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS 63 
 
nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in 
expressive activity.”294 The Court accordingly treats generally applicable laws not 
targeted at expression as raising no First Amendment issue, even when applied to 
the press.295  
Laws of this character pose little threat to free trade in ideas, while advancing 
unquestionably legitimate governmental interests. Generally applicable laws may 
increase the costs of speech for all market participants, but they have little potential 
to skew free trade in ideas in favor of particular market participants. For example, 
the Court has perceived no constitutional objection to a generally applicable law 
requiring building permits, even when applied to a newspaper seeking to build a 
new facility, since this type of generally applicable regulation is “rarely effective as 
a means of censorship.”296 Moreover, because the costs they impose are not 
triggered by expression—or even by conduct commonly associated with 
expression—they pose little risk that they will make the cost of expression unduly 
great. The bookstore owners in Arcara, for example, “remain[ed] free to sell the 
same materials at another location.”297 Thus, these laws usually pose no threat to 
the integrity of the marketplace of ideas sufficient to offset their justifications. To 
be sure, generally applicable laws that pose unusually potent burdens on all 
speakers—such as a generally applicable but confiscatory tax—might shut down 
the marketplace of ideas altogether, but the likelihood that a legislature could 
impose such a remarkably burdensome regulation on everyone and survive the next 
election is so slight that such cases, as a practical matter, never arise.298 
Generally applicable laws are not immune from First Amendment challenge, 
however, when they are enforced in ways that can skew the marketplace of ideas. 
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Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
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Under Wayte, if enforcement of a generally applicable law is targeted at disfavored 
speech or speakers, the First Amendment will provide a defense, as we have 
seen.299 In cases of selective enforcement, the burden on the individual speaker 
does not differ, but the threat to the free trade in ideas is much greater, and the 
government’s otherwise legitimate interest is compromised by its failure to enforce 
the law uniformly; this is what First Amendment jurisprudence characterizes as the 
problem of underinclusiveness.300 In such cases, the balance tilts against the 
government, and the defense of selective prosecution is recognized. Yet, as we 
have also seen, when the government can identify a legitimate law-enforcement 
basis for its enforcement decisions, even if they disproportionately disadvantage 
those engaged in protected speech, the balance tips in the direction of the 
government.301 Since selective prosecution cases involve only those who have 
engaged in unprotected conduct, it does not take much of a government interest to 
justify whatever skew in the marketplace of ideas that may result from prosecutive 
decisions—after all, speakers who want to avoid this kind of burden need only 
comply with the law. 
There will be occasions, however, in which a generally applicable law is applied 
to activities with a significant expressive component, as when the statutory 
prohibition on burning a draft card was applied to an antiwar protest in United 
States v. O’Brien.302 In this context, regulation directed at a “nonspeech element” 
will be upheld “if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . . 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest.”303 This final requirement is undemanding; it does not require, for 
example, that the government select the least restrictive alternative but only that the 
regulation advance the government’s interest more effectively than would be the 
case absent the regulation.304  
The greater scrutiny of incidental burdens on speech by laws directed at 
activities with a significant expressive component is warranted by the greater risk 
that even generally applicable regulation will skew the marketplace of ideas by 
having a disproportionate impact on disfavored speech or speakers. After all, 
majoritarian institutions are less likely to enact regulations that burden the 
expressive activities of the majority than they are those of dissenters.305 Thus, we 
see a modest increase in judicial scrutiny for incidental burdens on speech. Yet, 
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given that such regulation is not directed at expression and advances a speech-
neutral interest, and given as well the difficulties in making an empirical judgment 
about the degree to which different speakers and viewpoints may be 
disproportionately disadvantaged by such regulations, scrutiny is modest. Again, 
speakers who wish to avoid the burden imposed by such regulations need only 
avoid engaging in the nonspeech activity that triggers the regulation. O’Brien, for 
example, remained free to denounce the draft; he was prohibited only from 
destroying his draft card. Still, the greater threat to free trade in ideas for those who 
are sanctioned for expressive activities or conduct associated with expression 
produces a greater measure of judicial inquiry to determine whether there is a 
sufficient cost to the marketplace of ideas to offset the legitimate governmental 
interests advanced by the challenged regulation. 
Regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech involves a greater threat 
still to the marketplace of ideas, since the regulation is directed at a means of 
communication rather than some nonspeech element.306 Such regulation is 
considered permissible if it is not based on the content of speech, is narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leaves open ample 
alternative channels of communication.307 As with incidental restrictions, the 
narrow tailoring requirement does not require use of the least-speech-restrictive 
alternative but only regulation that advances the government’s interest more 
effectively than would occur in its absence.308  
This modest standard of scrutiny follows from the requirement of content-
neutrality, which is framed to minimize the risk that the regulation is aimed at 
disfavored speech or speakers: “The principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in 
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”309 The requirement of content-
neutrality minimizes the likelihood that a regulation will place identifiable speakers 
or views at a disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas. Nevertheless, the concern 
that majoritarian institutions, even when regulating speech in a content-neutral 
manner, will be less sensitive to the interests of disfavored speakers justifies a 
greater measure of scrutiny; the regulation of the time, place, and manner of 
speech, unlike regulations that only incidentally burden speech, requires an inquiry 
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into the adequacy of alternative means of communication not called for under the 
O’Brien test.310  
Finally, for a content-neutral regulation that entirely prohibits communication of 
a speaker’s preferred message—such as the statutory prohibition on disclosure of 
unlawfully intercepted communications at issue in Bartnicki v. Vopper311—the 
Court engages in straightforward balancing by weighing the interest in 
communicating the information against the countervailing governmental interest in 
protecting the privacy of communications.312 What the Court found decisive in that 
case was that the communications at issue involved contentious labor negotiations 
involving a public school district and a union, with union officials making veiled 
threats during the intercepted conversation.313 In that context, the Court held that 
“privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance.”314 Although the content-neutral statutory objective 
posed no inherent threat to skew the marketplace of ideas—and for that reason 
triggered no talk of strict scrutiny—as applied to a context in which the 
marketplace of ideas might be impoverished if deprived of information having 
particular public importance, the balance tipped in favor of communication. Thus, 
it was the public’s interest in obtaining the information, not merely the speaker’s 
interest in conveying it, that drove the decision. 
The Court has taken a similar approach to defamation. While acknowledging 
that the governmental interest in protecting individual reputations is sufficiently 
content-neutral to support regulation, the Court has balanced this interest against 
the threat to the free marketplace of ideas posed by the potential chilling effect of 
civil liability for defamation.315 For defamation involving public figures, the 
Court’s concern about preserving a vibrant marketplace of ideas has led it to limit 
defamation liability to cases involving intentional falsehood or reckless disregard 
for truth, but when the plaintiff is not a public figure, even when the speech at issue 
involves matters of public concern, the Court deems the reputational interests at 
stake to be weightier and has concluded that proof of no more than negligence is 
sufficient to support liability, although presumed damages cannot be awarded 
without proof of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth.316 In contrast, when 
the publication at issue addresses no matter of public concern, the Court deems the 
threat to the marketplace of ideas to be reduced, and for that reason has permitted 
an award of presumed damages without proof of knowing or reckless falsity.317 
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Accordingly, in the realm of content-neutral regulation, judicial scrutiny reflects 
pragmatic balancing, but is far more structured than the kind of ad hoc process 
roundly condemned by the purposivists. Judicial scrutiny is proportional to the 
likelihood that a regulation will skew the marketplace of ideas. When that 
likelihood increases, greater weight is placed on the side of liberty, not because the 
individual speaker’s interests in unfettered communication are greater, but because 
the interest in a vibrant marketplace of ideas is more directly implicated. This 
pattern becomes even clearer by examining regulations that are triggered by the 
content of speech. 
B. Content-Based Regulation and Free Trade in Ideas 
There was a time when the Court proclaimed that the trigger for strict judicial 
scrutiny of a challenged regulation was when it is based on the content of speech.318 
This blanket condemnation of content regulation did not last. For one thing, as the 
Court ultimately acknowledged, many unprotected categories of speech are 
properly defined by reference to the content of expression, such as obscenity, 
defamation, and fighting words.319 For another, the Court came to endorse a form 
of content discrimination in its forum jurisprudence; the Court held that when the 
government creates a forum in which private persons can engage in communicative 
activities, albeit for a limited purpose, the government may regulate the content of 
speech in that forum as long as the regulations are reasonable in light of the 
underlying purposes of the forum and not an effort to suppress identifiable 
viewpoints.320 Beyond that, as we have seen, the Court’s balancing jurisprudence is 
itself sensitive to content—the outcome in Bartnicki and the degree of protection 
granted defendants in defamation actions turn on the content of the speech at 
issue.321 Thus, a categorical rule regarding content discrimination as inherently 
suspect proved to be unsupportable.322 Eventually, the Court concluded that content 
discrimination is not impermissible “so long as the nature of the content 
discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression 
of ideas is afoot.”323  
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Ultimately, the Court came to regard discrimination against disfavored speakers, 
subjects, or viewpoints, as the most serious type of threat to First Amendment 
values.324 Strict scrutiny is required for “content discrimination [that] ‘raises the 
specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from 
the marketplace.’”325 In contrast, the Court treats seemingly content-based 
regulation of establishments offering sexually oriented entertainment as a content-
neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech subject to intermediate 
scrutiny when justified by reference to the harmful “secondary effects” of such 
establishments on the surrounding community as long as it leaves open sufficient 
alternative avenues for sexually oriented expression.326 Similarly, seemingly 
content-based regulation of solicitation near health care facilities is treated as a 
time, place, or manner regulation when justified by reference to patient privacy as 
long as ample alternative avenues for expression are preserved.327 Thus, even 
regulation triggered by the content of expression is subject to less demanding 
scrutiny when it is unlikely to unduly skew the marketplace of ideas because it 
advances a content-neutral governmental interest while permitting sufficient 
alternative methods of communication. In such cases, the threat to the integrity of 
the marketplace of ideas is limited—as in the time, place, or manner cases. It is 
when the government subjects identifiable speakers or viewpoints to regulatory 
burdens not imposed on others that a threat to the integrity of competition that 
judicial scrutiny becomes more demanding. In such cases, under the balancing 
metric discussed here, concerns about preserving the integrity of competition in the 
marketplace of ideas become more urgent. 
Consider, for example, the difference between a content-neutral ban on 
residential picketing of the type that the Court is likely to uphold as a reasonable 
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech,328 and a discretionary system of 
permitting picketing upon payment of a fee set by local law-enforcement officials 
to recoup regulatory costs that the Court would be likely to treat as content-based 
and therefore subject to strict scrutiny because of the risk that the fee would be 
higher for unpopular speakers that might draw hostile audiences.329 From the 
standpoint of an individual speaker unable to engage in his preferred mode of 
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expression, it is far from clear which regulation is more odious. The ban on 
residential picketing may deprive the speaker of what he regards as an essential 
opportunity to confront an ideological opponent,330 whereas the permit fee may 
involve a quite modest financial burden.331 For the individual speakers subject to 
these regulations, the difference in their impact may not be great, but from the 
standpoint of the marketplace of ideas, the cost of content-based regulation with a 
potential to skew free trade in ideas is much higher. Content-neutral regulation, as 
we have seen, is generally structured to minimize the possibility that it will distort 
the marketplace of ideas in any systemic fashion. In contrast, an effective tax on 
unpopular speakers could create a significant skew in the marketplace of ideas. 
Accordingly, First Amendment doctrine requires much more rigorous justification 
for regulation of this character in light of its greater threat to First Amendment 
values. 
To be sure, at first blush, the Court’s skeptical treatment of regulation that harms 
disfavored speakers or viewpoints might seem to support the purposivist account. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Court has emphasized that a censorial 
governmental motive is not required for strict scrutiny.332 More fundamentally, the 
Court’s emphasis on protecting identifiable speakers or viewpoints from 
disadvantageous regulation is consistent with balancing. Content regulation 
demands strict scrutiny when it threatens to skew the marketplace of ideas because 
in that context the systemic interests in free speech are at their height. 
Nevertheless, there are times when First Amendment jurisprudence seems to 
abjure balancing. For example, the Court has held that the government cannot 
suppress expression as a means of avoiding giving offense to others,333 promoting 
ideological unity,334 or equalizing influence in the political process.335 The Court 
has similarly held that the government cannot prevent adults from having access to 
nonobscene sexually oriented expression in order to protect children because 
“‘[r]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest’ in protecting children, 
‘[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which 
would be suitable for a sandbox.’”336 More generally, the Court tells us that “[t]he 
point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in 
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some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content,”337 and, thus, 
the government cannot “handicap the expression of particular ideas.”338 These 
statements have the flavor of First Amendment absolutism, not balancing.  
Still, the seemingly absolutist elements of First Amendment doctrine, on 
inspection, turn out to be rather less absolutist than they might first appear. In each 
case in which the Court rejected a governmental interest as illegitimate and 
unworthy of balancing, the government effectively asserted an interest in skewing 
the marketplace of ideas. If the promotion of ideological unity were considered a 
legitimate governmental interest, for example, then First Amendment balancing 
would be emptied of content—the government could always undermine free trade 
of ideas by asserting its own interest in refashioning competitive balance in the 
market. The ability of sexually oriented expression to compete in the marketplace 
of ideas would be similarly circumscribed if only material fit for minors could be 
distributed. Beyond that, even these seeming absolutes can give way to balancing 
when a sufficiently compelling governmental interest comes into play that is not 
itself premised on an interest in altering competitive balance among competing 
ideologies.  
For example, even though the Court sometimes says that the government cannot 
handicap the expression of particular ideas, we have seen that when the threat of 
violence becomes imminent, First Amendment protection ends even for those who 
advocate violent change to the existing social or political order.339 First 
Amendment jurisprudence also permits the government to prohibit membership in 
an organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the government as long as 
each individual subject to the prohibition has a specific intent to achieve the violent 
overthrow of the government even when there is no imminent threat of violence.340 
Offers or conspiracies to engage in illegal activity are also unprotected even absent 
an imminent threat of illegal conduct.341 These seem to be classic cases of content, 
indeed even viewpoint regulation—as well as regulation justified by the 
communicative or persuasive effects of the proscribed speech—but they are 
supported by unusually powerful governmental interests. The specific intent 
requirement, accompanied by judicial review to ensure that the evidence establishes 
that the defendant’s speech has gone beyond a mere statement of belief into the 
realm of advocacy of action, is thought to provide sufficient protection of the 
individual interest in free speech. Whatever the threat to the marketplace of ideas 
posed by these regulations, given the government’s conceded ability to prohibit the 
objective that inheres in such speech, there is simply too much danger in such 
speech to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly, even though the government 
cannot ordinarily prohibit speech on the ground that it will offend others, that 
protection is also at an end when violence becomes imminent,342 or when the 
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speaker utilizes the kind of “fighting words” that are likely to provoke violence.343 
In such cases, again, unusually powerful governmental interests come into play, 
and what seems like an absolute gives way to pragmatic balancing. 
Indeed, recently the Court upheld a content-based and even viewpoint-based 
regulation of speech under strict scrutiny, concluding that the statutory prohibition 
on providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization was valid even 
when applied to support for a terrorist organization coming in the form of speech 
because of the critical national security interests advanced by the prohibition.344 At 
the same time, the Court stressed that the statute did not proscribe speech except 
when it was “coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign 
terrorist organization,” thereby, “[m]ost importantly, avoid[ing] any restriction on 
independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or 
controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”345 Independent advocacy, of course, 
implicates weightier liberty interests, and presumably for that reason the Court 
views its restriction as more problematic. The Court’s willingness to uphold a 
statutory prohibition quite likely to be applied to disfavored speech or speakers—at 
least when particularly powerful liberty interests are not at stake—demonstrates 
that First Amendment jurisprudence is at its core about balancing and not 
categorical protection.346 
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The First Amendment investigation reflects the same point. A First Amendment 
investigation is itself a form of content-based governmental action when the 
triggering event for an investigation is the content of expression—such as a 
speaker’s advocacy of violence, albeit without a sufficient threat of imminent 
violence to render the advocacy unprotected. Yet, as we have seen, in cases such as 
Branzburg in which the Court has confronted First Amendment investigations, it 
has refused to impose strict scrutiny. These cases treat with investigations, not 
prohibitions, so the inhibitory effects on speech do not rise to the level of a 
prohibition, while the justification for recognizing a broad investigative power is 
compelling. Thus, pragmatic balancing explains why some government actions 
based on the content of speech, which may well disadvantage identifiable speakers 
or viewpoints, nevertheless do not trigger strict scrutiny. 
Something similar can be observed in the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence—another type of content-based regulation. As we have seen, the 
Court has treated as illegitimate a governmental interest in regulating political 
speech as a means of equalizing influence in the political process.347 Although this 
has led the Court to impose strict scrutiny on limitations on political speech, when 
it comes to limitations on contributions to political candidates, the Court has taken 
a different view, even though such regulation is no less content-based than an 
absolute prohibition on certain types of political expenditures. The Court has 
observed that the inhibition on speech is not so great when the government merely 
restricts the ability to give money to others rather than the ability to articulate one’s 
own views and that the threat of corruption is greater for contributions than 
independent expenditures, and on that basis has applied a balancing test to 
contribution limitations that involves something less than strict scrutiny.348 As we 
also have seen, the Court has taken a similar approach to campaign-finance 
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disclosure requirements, upholding them under a balancing test that endeavors to 
assess the degree to which they may exert a chilling effect disproportionate to their 
justification.349 The rationale for this relatively lenient treatment is that disclosure 
requirements are thought to impose a less serious burden on liberty interests: 
“[D]isclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they . . . do not 
prevent anyone from speaking.”350 This is yet another example of a challenged 
government restriction that creates an inhibition on speech less potent than an 
outright prohibition; and as a consequence the Court is more willing to engage in 
something approaching ad hoc balancing.  
In short, the structure of judicial review of content-based regulation reflects a 
pragmatic balance. Given the cost to the marketplace of ideas of viewpoint-based 
regulation of expression—whether an intentional effort at censorship or an 
unintended result of content regulation likely to impose differential burdens on 
some speakers or viewpoints—strict scrutiny tilts the balance decisively toward 
free speech by requiring a showing that the challenged regulation is essential to an 
unusually important government interest. Still, strict scrutiny reflects a balancing 
process—it does not ignore the government’s interests, but instead requires an 
especially clear showing before that interest will trump free-speech interests. When 
governmental action reflects a risk of censorial motive but stops short of an outright 
prohibition, however, even content-based governmental action does not trigger 
strict scrutiny. 
C. The Role of Ad Hoc Balancing in First Amendment Doctrine 
The rather well-articulated structure of balancing in First Amendment doctrine 
weakens the objections to balancing. As we have seen, large swaths of First 
Amendment doctrine sharply circumscribe judicial discretion by developing a 
marketplace metric within which balancing occurs in a structured fashion. 
To the preceding account of First Amendment doctrine as reflecting structured 
balancing, one might object that the structure of First Amendment doctrine is no 
less consistent with the pragmatic than the purposivist account. As we have seen, 
purposivists explain the heightened scrutiny afforded content-based regulation as 
reflecting the greater risk that such regulation reflects official hostility to disfavored 
speech or speakers.351 Thus, the purposivist account likely is at least as satisfactory 
an explanation for the tiers of scrutiny found in First Amendment doctrine as the 
account offered above. Yet, the orderly looking spectrum of regulation described 
by the purposivists cannot accommodate the totality of First Amendment doctrine. 
The formal standards of scrutiny found in First Amendment doctrine involve 
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governmental prohibitions or sanctions. For that reason, their inhibitory effect can 
be assumed to be roughly constant, and the appropriate standard of review can 
therefore be based on the extent to which a challenged prohibition could be thought 
to skew free trade in ideas. In contrast, as we have seen, when it comes to 
governmental conduct that does not involve a prohibition but instead presents a 
“chilling effect,” First Amendment doctrine seems to offer little more than ad hoc 
balancing that endeavors to compare the extent of the inhibition on speech to the 
governmental interests at stake. Ad hoc balancing is the order of the day regardless 
of the risk that the regulation at issue is premised on an improper governmental 
motive. 
When the government imposes something less than a prohibition on free 
speech—such as in a First Amendment investigation—it seems impossible to reach 
an acceptable conclusion without considering the degree of inhibition imposed by 
the challenged practice as well as its justification. The regulation at issue in Meese 
v. Keene, for example, may be rife with the risk of improper motive, but its 
inhibitory effect was limited. The initiation of grand jury investigations may be 
similarly prone to improper motives, but the consequences of constraining the 
government’s ability to investigate are unacceptable, and the inhibitory effect of an 
investigation, while perhaps greater than the mandated disclosures in Meese v. 
Keene, is limited as well. In this fashion, ad hoc First Amendment balancing seems 
inescapable, at least in contexts in which it is difficult to generalize about the extent 
to which a government practice is likely to inhibit free speech. 
CONCLUSION 
One might think that the account of free speech doctrine advanced above 
suggests that First Amendment jurisprudence is about nothing other than pragmatic 
balancing. That conclusion, however, would overstate matters considerably. 
First Amendment jurisprudence is not confined to pragmatic considerations; it is 
replete with all of the modalities found in Philip Bobbit’s typology of constitutional 
arguments,352 including historical,353 ethical,354 and structural argument.355 Yet, 
these modalities of argument provide little basis for identifying the limits to First 
Amendment protection, as the First Amendment investigation makes plain. It is in 
identifying the limits of constitutional protection that pragmatic balancing becomes 
crucial. 
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Historical argument, as we have seen, provides little basis for assessing the 
extent of the First Amendment’s protections because of the lack of clarity about the 
extent to which the bad-tendency test permitted government regulation of speech 
and the press in the framing era.356 The problem with ethical and structural 
argument, in turn, is that they are by their nature absolutist—any speech within the 
scope of the ethical or structural principle thought to justify First Amendment 
protection is immune from regulation. Consider, for example, Robert Bork’s view 
that political speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.357 As we have seen, 
this is not much of an historical argument,358 but it is a perfectly sound structural 
argument given the centrality of political speech to the republican form of 
government created by the Constitution.359 Nevertheless, because it takes a 
categorical rather than a balancing approach to the First Amendment, the structural 
argument for protection of political speech provides absolute immunity from 
regulation within the protected category. On this view, for example, the 
government seemingly would be unable to conduct any investigation of those who 
advocate violence on political grounds because of the chilling effect that such an 
investigation might have on political speech—a view utterly at odds with both 
precedent and reason. Indeed, as we have seen, even the advocates of First 
Amendment restrictions on investigations refrain from such absolutism.360 Yet, the 
only other option for a structuralist would be to decide that a mere chilling effect, 
unaccompanied by any type of sanction, does not amount to an “abridgement” of 
free speech. As we have seen, however, this position is no more consistent with 
precedent, and little more attractive, given the potential for truly abusive 
investigations to chill political dissent. Only pragmatic balancing can begin to 
provide a satisfactory account of the “chilling effect” problem. Any account of First 
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Amendment jurisprudence that ignores pragmatic balancing is, at best, seriously 
incomplete. 
Interestingly, Judge Bork, one of the most rigorous originalists of our time,361 
eventually repudiated his position that the First Amendment protects only political 
speech, concluding that a rule protecting only political speech would be too easily 
circumvented, and conceding that much nonpolitical speech ultimately advances 
the search for political truth as well.362 That sounds like pragmatism to me. When it 
comes to the First Amendment, one finds pragmatism even in the most unexpected 
places. 
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